/

CVE-2026-30831

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Authentication Bypass in Rocket.Chat Enterprise DDP Streamer

CVE-2026-30831

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authentication Bypass

CWE:

CWE-287, CWE-304

Impact:

Account Takeover and 2FA Bypass

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Rocket.Chat's enterprise DDP Streamer service exposed an Account.login method that did not enforce Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) or validate user account status.

Under certain conditions, an attacker could authenticate as a valid user, including deactivated accounts or users with mandatory 2FA, by leveraging this alternative login path.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects Rocket.Chat deployments using the enterprise DDP Streamer service where:

  • The DDP Streamer exposes the Account.login method to clients
  • 2FA is configured or required for some or all users, and/or user deactivation is used as an access control measure
  • The deployment relies on the standard Meteor login flow to enforce 2FA and account status checks

The issue manifests when applications, integrations, or clients authenticate through the DDP Streamer instead of the primary login route, thereby skipping critical security checks.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible Rocket.Chat enterprise DDP Streamer endpoint.
  • Required access: Ability to reach the DDP Streamer and submit login requests (no prior authentication required).
  • Trigger point: Invoking the Account.login method exposed through the DDP Streamer instead of the standard Meteor login API.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The DDP Streamer Account.login implementation does not replicate the full security logic of the main authentication flow, omitting 2FA enforcement and account status validation, which allows authentication to succeed for users who should be challenged or blocked.

Why this happens

At its core, this is an authentication logic inconsistency between two login paths:

  • The primary Meteor login flow enforces 2FA and checks account status (e.g., deactivated/disabled users).
  • The DDP Streamer Account.login method exposes a parallel authentication mechanism without replicating these checks.

This maps to:

  • CWE-287: Improper Authentication — authentication decisions are made without verifying all required conditions (such as 2FA proof or account enablement).
  • CWE-304: Missing Critical Step in Authentication — the login process omits mandatory steps that are present in the canonical flow.

Architecturally, the bug stems from duplicating authentication entry points without centralizing or reusing the full security policy, leading to a "backdoor" login route that is easier to satisfy than the officially supported one.

Potential impact

  • Bypass of mandatory Two-Factor Authentication requirements for affected Rocket.Chat users
  • Login as deactivated or disabled accounts that should no longer have access
  • Account takeover if valid credentials (or session replay mechanisms) are used without 2FA enforcement
  • Lateral movement and data exposure within Rocket.Chat workspaces using compromised or deactivated accounts
  • Breakdown of security assumptions for compliance and audit trails that rely on deactivation and 2FA policies

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation generally revolves around centralizing and hardening authentication logic:

  • Ensure all authentication entry points invoke a shared, canonical login routine that:
  • Enforces 2FA based on organizational policy and per-user settings
  • Consistently checks account status (active, blocked, deactivated, locked)
  • Applies rate limiting, IP throttling, and anomaly detection uniformly
  • Avoid exposing low-level authentication methods directly over auxiliary protocols (e.g., streaming interfaces, admin APIs) without wrapping them in the same policy enforcement layer as the main login flow.
  • Implement architectural patterns where:
  • Authentication decisions are made in a single, audited component or service
  • New integrations or streaming endpoints call this central component rather than re-implementing login logic.
  • Use configuration and deployment guardrails so that:
  • Non-interactive channels (like DDP streams, bots, or service accounts) have constrained scopes and are segregated from user-facing authentication.
  • 2FA requirements and account status checks are enforced at the authorization layer as well, reducing the impact of missed checks in one path.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect similar issues and monitor this class of vulnerability using multiple approaches:

  • Code and architecture review:
  • Identify all code paths that perform authentication or create user sessions.
  • Verify that each path calls a shared, security-reviewed authentication routine.
  • Flag any direct credential checks or login-like operations that bypass the standard flow.
  • Static analysis and linting:
  • Add rules to detect multiple implementations of authentication logic or direct password verification outside the canonical auth module.
  • Look for exported or remotely callable methods that both accept credentials and create sessions without passing through central policy enforcement.
  • Runtime monitoring and logging:
  • Instrument detailed logs on all login and session creation events, including method/source (web UI, DDP Streamer, API, SSO).
  • Build alerts for logins that:
  • Lack associated 2FA challenges where 2FA is required.
  • Originate from unexpected or low-visibility endpoints (e.g., streaming channels).
  • Security testing and CI/CD checks:
  • Include dynamic tests that attempt authentication through alternate interfaces (streaming APIs, admin endpoints, legacy routes) to confirm consistent 2FA enforcement and account status checks.
  • Integrate automated tools that model authentication flows and highlight unused or alternative login mechanisms.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/RocketChat/Rocket.Chat/security/advisories/GHSA-7qr6-q62g-hm63

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If the enterprise DDP Streamer endpoint is reachable over the network, an attacker can attempt to authenticate through it without prior access, using valid credentials and bypassing additional checks.

The attacker must be able to connect to the DDP Streamer and know or obtain valid user credentials (or other accepted login factors). No existing Rocket.Chat account or session is required; the weakness lies in how the login request is processed.

Consolidate all authentication logic into a single, central mechanism and ensure every interface that can log users in (web UI, APIs, streaming services, integrations) invokes that mechanism. Explicitly enforce 2FA and account status checks there, and avoid duplicating or shortcutting authentication flows in secondary services.

Design the system so that new endpoints cannot perform authentication without going through a standardized, tested, and policy-aware login service. Back this with security reviews focused on alternate login paths, automated tests that verify 2FA and account status enforcement across all interfaces, and static analysis rules that flag standalone credential verification logic.

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