Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Unrestricted File Upload in Tsinghua Unigroup Electronic

CVE-2026-2684

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unrestricted File Upload

CWE:

CWE-284, CWE-434

Impact:

Remote Code Execution and Data Compromise (via arbitrary file upload)

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Tsinghua Unigroup Electronic Archives System up to version 3.2.210802(62532) contains an unrestricted file upload vulnerability in /Archive/ErecordManage/uploadFile.html.

By manipulating the File parameter, a remote attacker may be able to upload arbitrary files, potentially leading to code execution, data compromise, or service abuse if the uploaded content is processed or executed by the server.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in the web-based Electronic Archives System's file upload functionality exposed at /Archive/ErecordManage/uploadFile.html.

It is relevant in deployments where the application accepts file uploads tied to archive or record management operations and does not strictly validate file types, content, or storage locations.

The risk is higher when uploaded files are stored in web-accessible directories, interpreted by the server (e.g., as scripts), or later consumed by backend processes with elevated privileges or implicit trust in the uploaded content.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public or internal web interface exposing /Archive/ErecordManage/uploadFile.html.
  • Required access: Network access to the application; depending on configuration, this may be exploitable by unauthenticated or low-privileged users if they can reach the upload endpoint.
  • Trigger point: Submission of a crafted HTTP request to the uploadFile.html endpoint with a manipulated File parameter containing attacker-controlled content.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The upload handler appears to lack robust checks on file type, extension, content, and storage location, and does not enforce sufficient authorization controls (CWE-284), allowing arbitrary files to be uploaded where they may later be executed or processed.

Why this happens

The core issue is an improperly constrained file upload mechanism that accepts and stores user-supplied files without adequate validation or enforcement of security policies.

According to CWE-434 (Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type), the application likely fails to:

  • Restrict uploads to a safe allowlist of content types and extensions,
  • Inspect and sanitize file content, and
  • Store uploads in non-executable, segregated locations.

Additionally, CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) suggests that the upload endpoint may not sufficiently limit who can upload or what they are allowed to upload.

This combination of weak content validation and lax access control allows attacker-supplied files to enter trusted storage paths where they may be executed, served publicly, or consumed by backend logic.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary server-side code if uploaded files can be interpreted as scripts or executable content.
  • Unauthorized access to or modification of archived documents and records.
  • Use of the server as a malware or phishing file host, impacting users who download the malicious content.
  • Privilege escalation or lateral movement if backend processes consume or trust the uploaded files.
  • Disruption of service availability through storage exhaustion or uploads designed to destabilize backend processors.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation relies on tightening both file handling and access control around the upload feature rather than relying solely on version-specific patches.

General defensive patterns include:

  • Strong allowlisting of file types: Restrict uploads to a minimal set of known-safe formats (e.g., specific document or image types) using both MIME type checks and strict extension checks.
  • Content-based validation: Inspect file headers and structure server-side to verify that the content matches the claimed type; avoid trusting client-side indicators.
  • Non-executable storage locations: Store uploaded files outside of web-accessible or executable directories, and configure the server so uploaded paths are never treated as code.
  • Randomized file naming and paths: Remove user control over final filenames and directories to reduce the ability to predict or overwrite critical resources.
  • Access control on upload functionality: Limit upload capabilities to authenticated and authorized roles, and align permissions with the principle of least privilege (addressing CWE-284).
  • Post-upload sanity checks: Apply antivirus or content scanning where appropriate and enforce size limits and quotas to mitigate abuse.
  • Separation of duties in processing: If files must be processed, use separate, low-privilege services or sandboxes to handle parsing and transformation.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can approach detection by combining code-level inspection with behavioral monitoring:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Flag endpoints implementing file upload without clear allowlists for extensions and MIME types.
  • Look for direct writes of uploaded content to webroot or executable paths.
  • Verify that access control checks are enforced before handling uploads.
  • Identify file handling logic that lacks server-side content inspection.
  • Configuration and policy checks:
  • Ensure that web server and application server configurations disable script execution in upload directories.
  • Use security linters or policy-as-code tools to enforce non-executable upload storage.
  • Runtime and log monitoring:
  • Monitor logs for abnormal upload patterns (unusual file extensions, high volume from a single source, or uploads followed by direct access).
  • Watch for requests executing from upload directories or newly created paths.
  • Automated scanning:
  • Employ web application security scanners configured to test file uploads with various file types and extensions.
  • Integrate SAST/DAST tools into CI/CD pipelines to detect newly introduced unrestricted upload paths.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/luoye197-prog/ziguang-fileupload
github.comgithub.com/luoye197-prog/ziguang-fileupload/blob/main/introduce%26poc
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?ctiid.346475
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?id.346475
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?submit.753973

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. The vulnerability exists in a web-accessible upload endpoint, so a remote attacker with network access to the application can attempt exploitation, subject to any authentication or network restrictions in place.

That depends on how the Electronic Archives System is deployed.

If the uploadFile.html endpoint is exposed to unauthenticated users or low-privileged roles, those users may be able to abuse it.

Properly restricting upload capabilities to trusted, authenticated roles significantly reduces the attack surface.

The most robust pattern is to implement strict, server-side file validation and storage controls:

allowlist-only safe file types, perform content inspection, store files in non-executable locations, and ensure access controls are enforced before any upload logic runs.

Combining these with secure server configuration (no script execution in upload directories) provides a defense-in-depth fix.

Adopt a standardized, reusable file upload component or library that:

enforces allowlists, validates content, manages safe storage paths, and integrates with centralized access control.

Complement this with security-focused code review, automated scanning for file upload patterns, and infrastructure policies that prevent execution from upload directories.

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