Summary
The OpenClaw Voice Call plugin's Telnyx webhook handler can accept unsigned inbound webhook requests when the Telnyx public key is not configured, causing TelnyxProvider.verifyWebhook() to effectively fail open.
In this state, any attacker who can reach the voice-call webhook endpoint may forge Telnyx events via arbitrary HTTP POST requests, leading to unauthorized call control and event spoofing in affected OpenClaw deployments.
Affected context
This vulnerability affects OpenClaw deployments running version 2026.2.13 and below where:
- The optional
@openclaw/voice-callplugin is installed and enabled - The Telnyx webhook endpoint is exposed to the attacker (e.g., via public URL, tunnel, or reverse proxy)
- The Telnyx integration is configured without a
telnyx.publicKeyvalue
In such configurations, the Telnyx webhook verification logic may treat any inbound HTTP POST request as a valid Telnyx event, bypassing the expected Ed25519 signature verification.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The HTTP endpoint used by the Voice Call plugin as the Telnyx webhook URL.
- Required access: Network reachability to the webhook endpoint; no Telnyx account or credentials are required if the public key is unset.
- Trigger point: Sending a crafted HTTP POST request that conforms to the expected Telnyx event schema to the webhook URL.
- Why exploitation is possible: TelnyxProvider.verifyWebhook() relies on Ed25519 signature verification, but when
telnyx.publicKeyis not configured, the verification path effectively fails open and does not enforce authentication, leading the application to trust unauthenticated events.
Why this happens
The underlying issue is a missing authentication enforcement in the webhook verification logic, aligning with CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function.
The Telnyx webhook handler is expected to authenticate requests using Ed25519 signatures and a configured Telnyx public key.
However, when telnyx.publicKey is absent, the verification routine does not fail closed; instead, it accepts requests without validating their origin, turning a critical security control into an optional check.
This "fail-open" behavior allows untrusted network traffic to influence privileged call-handling logic as if it were authenticated provider traffic.
Potential impact
- Attackers could forge inbound Telnyx events to simulate calls being started, answered, or completed.
- Unauthorized triggering of voice-call flows, notifications, or automations tied to Telnyx events.
- Manipulation of call state within OpenClaw, potentially causing denial of service for legitimate calls.
- Confusion or social engineering opportunities by spoofing call-related events in logs, dashboards, or other observability tools.
- Unintended resource consumption (e.g., processing fake calls or workflows).
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing strict authentication for all webhook entry points and avoiding fail-open verification flows:
- Treat the Telnyx webhook as a critical interface that must always validate request authenticity before processing the payload.
- Ensure verification routines are implemented as "fail-closed": if the Telnyx public key or other verification material is missing or invalid, reject all requests by default.
- Require configuration completeness checks on startup so that the Voice Call plugin cannot run without a valid
telnyx.publicKeywhen Telnyx webhooks are enabled. - Isolate and protect webhook endpoints behind network controls (e.g., IP allowlisting, API gateways, or service meshes) to reduce unsolicited traffic.
- Apply least-privilege patterns in how webhook events are mapped to internal actions, avoiding direct, unconditional execution of sensitive operations based solely on external events.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can use a combination of code-level and operational controls to detect this class of issue:
- Static analysis & code review: Look for webhook handlers that:
- Process provider events without a mandatory signature or MAC verification step.
- Contain conditional logic where authentication checks are skipped or downgraded when configuration values are missing.
- Do not explicitly handle "verification configuration missing" as an error state.
- Configuration audits: Automatically scan deployment configuration (infrastructure as code, environment variables, secrets managers) to flag cases where webhooks are enabled but cryptographic verification keys are not set.
- Runtime monitoring: Log all webhook verification outcomes and alert on:
- Verification being disabled or skipped.
- High volumes of failed or malformed webhook requests.
- Webhook traffic from unexpected IP ranges or autonomous systems.
- Automated security testing tools or CI policies can enforce that webhook endpoints are covered by authentication and verification logic before deployments are promoted.

