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CVE-2026-26319

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Missing Authentication / Authorization in OpenClaw Voice

CVE-2026-26319

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication / Authorization

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Unauthorized Request Forgery and Call Control

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The OpenClaw Voice Call plugin's Telnyx webhook handler can accept unsigned inbound webhook requests when the Telnyx public key is not configured, causing TelnyxProvider.verifyWebhook() to effectively fail open.

In this state, any attacker who can reach the voice-call webhook endpoint may forge Telnyx events via arbitrary HTTP POST requests, leading to unauthorized call control and event spoofing in affected OpenClaw deployments.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects OpenClaw deployments running version 2026.2.13 and below where:

  • The optional @openclaw/voice-call plugin is installed and enabled
  • The Telnyx webhook endpoint is exposed to the attacker (e.g., via public URL, tunnel, or reverse proxy)
  • The Telnyx integration is configured without a telnyx.publicKey value

In such configurations, the Telnyx webhook verification logic may treat any inbound HTTP POST request as a valid Telnyx event, bypassing the expected Ed25519 signature verification.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The HTTP endpoint used by the Voice Call plugin as the Telnyx webhook URL.
  • Required access: Network reachability to the webhook endpoint; no Telnyx account or credentials are required if the public key is unset.
  • Trigger point: Sending a crafted HTTP POST request that conforms to the expected Telnyx event schema to the webhook URL.
  • Why exploitation is possible: TelnyxProvider.verifyWebhook() relies on Ed25519 signature verification, but when telnyx.publicKey is not configured, the verification path effectively fails open and does not enforce authentication, leading the application to trust unauthenticated events.

Why this happens

The underlying issue is a missing authentication enforcement in the webhook verification logic, aligning with CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function.

The Telnyx webhook handler is expected to authenticate requests using Ed25519 signatures and a configured Telnyx public key.

However, when telnyx.publicKey is absent, the verification routine does not fail closed; instead, it accepts requests without validating their origin, turning a critical security control into an optional check.

This "fail-open" behavior allows untrusted network traffic to influence privileged call-handling logic as if it were authenticated provider traffic.

Potential impact

  • Attackers could forge inbound Telnyx events to simulate calls being started, answered, or completed.
  • Unauthorized triggering of voice-call flows, notifications, or automations tied to Telnyx events.
  • Manipulation of call state within OpenClaw, potentially causing denial of service for legitimate calls.
  • Confusion or social engineering opportunities by spoofing call-related events in logs, dashboards, or other observability tools.
  • Unintended resource consumption (e.g., processing fake calls or workflows).

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing strict authentication for all webhook entry points and avoiding fail-open verification flows:

  • Treat the Telnyx webhook as a critical interface that must always validate request authenticity before processing the payload.
  • Ensure verification routines are implemented as "fail-closed": if the Telnyx public key or other verification material is missing or invalid, reject all requests by default.
  • Require configuration completeness checks on startup so that the Voice Call plugin cannot run without a valid telnyx.publicKey when Telnyx webhooks are enabled.
  • Isolate and protect webhook endpoints behind network controls (e.g., IP allowlisting, API gateways, or service meshes) to reduce unsolicited traffic.
  • Apply least-privilege patterns in how webhook events are mapped to internal actions, avoiding direct, unconditional execution of sensitive operations based solely on external events.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can use a combination of code-level and operational controls to detect this class of issue:

  • Static analysis & code review: Look for webhook handlers that:
  • Process provider events without a mandatory signature or MAC verification step.
  • Contain conditional logic where authentication checks are skipped or downgraded when configuration values are missing.
  • Do not explicitly handle "verification configuration missing" as an error state.
  • Configuration audits: Automatically scan deployment configuration (infrastructure as code, environment variables, secrets managers) to flag cases where webhooks are enabled but cryptographic verification keys are not set.
  • Runtime monitoring: Log all webhook verification outcomes and alert on:
  • Verification being disabled or skipped.
  • High volumes of failed or malformed webhook requests.
  • Webhook traffic from unexpected IP ranges or autonomous systems.
  • Automated security testing tools or CI policies can enforce that webhook endpoints are covered by authentication and verification logic before deployments are promoted.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/29b587e73cbdc941caec573facd16e87d52f007b
github.comgithub.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/f47584fec86d6d73f2d483043a2ad0e7e3c50411
github.comgithub.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.14
github.comgithub.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-4hg8-92x6-h2f3

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the Telnyx webhook endpoint is publicly reachable (for example, via a tunnel, proxy, or direct exposure) and the Voice Call plugin is enabled without a configured Telnyx public key. In that case, a remote attacker can send forged HTTP POST requests that will be accepted as legitimate events.

No. When telnyx.publicKey is not configured, the verification logic does not enforce the Ed25519 signature check. An attacker only needs the webhook URL and network access to it; no Telnyx account or signature is required.

The most robust fix pattern is to enforce mandatory authentication for all webhook handlers and design the verification logic to fail closed. If the necessary cryptographic verification data (such as a public key) is absent or invalid, the service should refuse to start or should reject all incoming webhook requests.

Treat webhooks as privileged entry points: require cryptographic verification for every request, validate configuration at startup, and explicitly handle "missing verification configuration" as an error state. Additionally, combine these patterns with network-level protections, least-privilege mappings from events to actions, and systematic security reviews of any third-party webhook integration.

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