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CVE-2026-53868

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Missing Authentication (CWE-306) in Capgo Account Deletion

CVE-2026-53868

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication / Authorization

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Denial of Service / Account Lockout

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Capgo lacks proper authentication and email ownership verification during account registration and deletion workflows, allowing accounts to be created with arbitrary email addresses.

An attacker can register using a victim's email, request deletion, and lock that email in a pending deletion state, effectively denying the legitimate user access to the platform for up to 30 days.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in Capgo's user account lifecycle management, specifically around registration and deletion flows.

It is relevant when email addresses are treated as unique identifiers but ownership is not verified before allowing sensitive operations like account creation or deletion requests.

Environments that rely on email-based identity without mandatory verification or reauthentication are particularly exposed to this issue.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public-facing registration and account deletion endpoints.
  • Required access: No prior authentication is needed beyond the ability to sign up; an attacker only needs knowledge of a target's email address.
  • Trigger point: Creation of an account using a victim's email address followed by initiation of the deletion process for that account.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The system does not enforce proven email ownership (e.g., via verification or reauthentication) before allowing account creation and deletion requests, allowing attackers to control lifecycle actions for identities they do not own.

Why this happens

The root cause aligns with CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function, where security-sensitive operations are exposed without sufficient verification of the requesting user's identity.

In this case, email addresses are accepted and used for account lifecycle operations (including deletion) without robust checks that the actor actually owns the email.

This design flaw allows critical actions—such as initiating an account deletion window linked to an email identifier—to be performed by unauthenticated or improperly authenticated parties.

Potential impact

  • Attackers can lock legitimate users out of their accounts for extended periods (e.g., 30 days).
  • Email addresses may be effectively hijacked within the platform, preventing rightful owners from registering or accessing services.
  • Customer support workload can increase significantly due to account recovery and dispute handling.
  • Users may lose access to data or services tied to their email-based identity during the lockout period.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing strong identity verification around account lifecycle operations and reducing trust in unverified identifiers.

Patterns include:

  • Requiring mandatory email verification before activating an account or allowing any sensitive operation, such as deletion or disabling.
  • Implementing reauthentication or step-up verification (e.g., password prompt, second factor, or signed link) before initiating account deletion.
  • Decoupling deletion windows from simple registration events by ensuring that only verified and fully authenticated sessions can trigger long-term state changes.
  • Designing deletion workflows with a reversible or challenge-based mechanism for legitimate owners (e.g., confirmation links sent to the verified email).
  • Applying least-privilege principles so unverified or low-trust accounts have minimal impact on the global identity namespace (such as email addresses).

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves reviewing both code and business logic for missing checks around critical identity operations.

Approaches include:

  • Static analysis or manual review to identify account creation and deletion endpoints that lack authentication or ownership verification steps.
  • Security-focused review of user lifecycle diagrams and sequence flows to ensure verification gates exist before sensitive state transitions.
  • Logging and monitoring for patterns such as multiple registrations or deletion requests targeting diverse email addresses from the same IP or account.
  • Policy enforcement in CI/CD requiring security sign-off for changes that touch authentication, registration, or account deletion logic.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Cap-go/capgo/security/advisories/GHSA-3wfv-m8fq-7r5g
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/capgo-denial-of-service-via-unverified-email-account-registration-and-deletion

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. Anyone with internet access to the Capgo registration and deletion endpoints can potentially exploit this issue using only a target's email address.

The attacker only needs the ability to create an account and initiate deletion; no prior account with the victim's credentials or internal access is required.

Introduce strict ownership verification and authentication around account lifecycle operations, ensuring only fully verified and authenticated users can initiate actions like deletion that affect an email identity.

Treat registration, verification, and deletion as security-sensitive workflows; require email verification, reauthentication, and explicit confirmation for critical state changes, and subject these flows to dedicated security design and review.

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