Summary
The WebSocket authentication interface does not enforce limits on repeated authentication attempts, allowing attackers to send unlimited login or auth requests.
Under active abuse, this can lead to denial-of-service by overwhelming or mis-routing legitimate charger telemetry, and may also facilitate brute-force attacks that gain unauthorized access.
Affected context
This vulnerability affects systems that expose a WebSocket-based API for authentication or session establishment, particularly where the same channel also carries charger telemetry or other operational data.
It is most relevant when:
- The WebSocket endpoint accepts repeated credentials or tokens without enforcing rate limits or lockouts
- Authentication failures are not met with backoff or throttling
- Telemetry and control traffic share the same infrastructure, allowing auth floods to interfere with normal data flow
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Publicly reachable or network-accessible WebSocket authentication endpoint.
- Required access: Ability to open WebSocket connections and send authentication requests (no prior credentials needed).
- Trigger point: Repeated, automated authentication attempts sent in rapid succession over one or many WebSocket connections.
- Why exploitation is possible: The server applies no effective rate limiting, lockout, or per-identity throttling on failed authentication attempts, allowing unbounded request volume and credential guessing.
Why this happens
The root cause is the absence of controls that limit the number or frequency of authentication attempts over the WebSocket interface.
This aligns with CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts, where systems fail to implement lockouts, throttling, or exponential backoff after repeated failures.
In this design, each authentication request is processed with equal priority and no cumulative penalty for repeated failures, creating conditions for both resource exhaustion and systematic brute-force guessing of credentials.
Potential impact
- Attackers could overwhelm the WebSocket service, degrading or denying access to legitimate charger telemetry.
- Telemetry may be suppressed or delayed, impacting monitoring, billing, or operational decision-making.
- Brute-force attacks could eventually guess weak credentials or tokens, leading to unauthorized access.
- Compromise of charger management interfaces could enable manipulation of charging behavior or configuration.
- Infrastructure instability under sustained load could affect availability of related backend services.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on adding layered controls around the WebSocket authentication flow rather than relying on any single mechanism.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Implementing rate limiting per IP address, account identifier, and WebSocket connection for authentication requests.
- Applying progressive delays or exponential backoff after repeated failed attempts to slow automated guessing.
- Introducing temporary account lockouts or step-up verification after a configurable number of failures, balanced against usability and lockout abuse risks.
- Separating telemetry channels from authentication-heavy control channels where feasible, so auth spikes do not starve operational data.
- Monitoring and capping concurrent WebSocket sessions per client or tenant to reduce amplification potential.
- Designing authentication workflows with strong credentials and multi-factor mechanisms to further reduce brute-force feasibility.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically involves both code-centric and behavior-centric approaches:
- Static and code review signals:
- WebSocket authentication handlers that accept credentials without any reference to rate limiting, lockout, or retry policies.
- Absence of middleware or gateway rules that cap authentication attempts per identity or network source.
- Shared channels where sensitive telemetry and authentication share the same unprotected endpoint.
- Runtime and log-based analysis:
- Monitoring for abnormally high volumes of failed authentication attempts from specific sources or across the system.
- Alerting on spikes in WebSocket connection churn or auth message frequency that correlate with degraded telemetry delivery.
- Using API gateways, WAFs, or specialized traffic management tools to detect and flag abusive patterns, with policies that can throttle or block offenders.

