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CVE-2026-25660

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Authentication and Authorization Bypass in CodeChecker Web

CVE-2026-25660

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authentication and Authorization Bypass

CWE:

CWE-290, CWE-863

Impact:

Privilege Escalation and Full Authorization Compromise

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A critical authentication and authorization flaw in CodeChecker allows certain URLs ending with the Authentication path, together with specific backend function calls, to bypass normal access controls.

Under these conditions, an attacker can assign arbitrary permissions to any existing CodeChecker user account, effectively escalating privileges without valid authentication.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects deployments of CodeChecker (through 6.27.3) where the web interface and its backend services are exposed to users over HTTP(S).

The issue manifests in request paths that end with the Authentication endpoint and hit specific authorization-related functions on the server.

In such flows, the application incorrectly trusts the request context and fails to enforce proper authentication and authorization checks before granting or modifying user permissions.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) endpoints of the CodeChecker web interface and its API.
  • Required access: Network access to the CodeChecker service (this may be internal-only or internet-facing, depending on deployment).
  • Trigger point: Sending crafted requests to URLs that end with the Authentication path and invoke affected permission-handling functions.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server-side logic incorrectly treats certain requests as authenticated or authorized based solely on the URL pattern or function call context, leading to missing or insufficient checks before assigning permissions to existing users.

Why this happens

The core issue is a mismatch between the intended security model and the actual enforcement in code, aligning with CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization and CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing.

Certain backend paths or handler functions appear to assume that reaching them implies a prior successful authentication step, but they do not independently verify the caller's identity or authorization level.

This design allows an attacker who can construct suitable requests to bypass authentication and directly manipulate authorization state, granting arbitrary roles or permissions to existing user accounts.

Abstractly, this pattern represents business-logic level access control flaws where authorization decisions depend on request routing or naming conventions instead of explicit, centralized checks tied to a verified user identity.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may grant themselves administrator or equivalent high-privilege roles on the CodeChecker instance.
  • An attacker could arbitrarily escalate the permissions of any existing user account.
  • Critical configuration data, analysis results, and defect databases can be viewed, modified, or deleted.
  • Integrity of static analysis reports and associated audit trails can be compromised, affecting trust in CI/CD and code-review workflows.
  • The compromised CodeChecker environment can be used as a pivot point to influence downstream development and deployment processes.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation centers on strict, centralized enforcement of authentication and authorization for all permission-changing operations:

  • Ensure that any endpoint capable of modifying user roles, groups, or permissions performs explicit authentication and authorization checks, independent of URL patterns or assumed call contexts.
  • Adopt a centralized authorization layer or middleware that enforces role- and permission-checking for all sensitive operations, rather than relying on ad hoc checks within individual handlers.
  • Design APIs such that permission-granting operations require a proven, strongly authenticated administrator session and are not reachable via unauthenticated or semi-authenticated flows.
  • Follow a least-privilege design so that default accounts and roles have minimal permissions, reducing the blast radius if a logic error occurs.
  • Use secure coding patterns that treat URLs and client-provided parameters as untrusted; do not infer authentication state or privileges from path structure, referrers, or caller assumptions.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves reviewing both code and runtime behavior for broken access control patterns:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Identify endpoints that modify user accounts, roles, or permissions and verify that they all perform explicit authentication and authorization checks.
  • Look for business logic that conditions access solely on URL patterns, function naming, or client-supplied flags rather than a verified user identity and role.
  • Flag instances where different authentication or authorization logic is applied inconsistently across similar endpoints.
  • Policy and automated checks:
  • Enforce development policies that all state-changing operations related to user management must pass through a common authorization module.
  • Use automated tools or custom linters to detect direct permission modifications outside of approved access-control abstractions.
  • Runtime monitoring:
  • Monitor audit logs for unusual role or permission changes, especially for accounts that did not recently authenticate or for changes originating from unexpected IP ranges.
  • Alert on permission changes initiated via endpoints that are normally used only in administrative workflows.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Ericsson/codechecker/security/advisories/GHSA-4v9x-cqc5-j645

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if an attacker can reach the CodeChecker web/API endpoints over the network, they can potentially exploit this flaw without valid credentials, depending on how the service is exposed.

The core issue is an authentication and authorization bypass. In many deployment scenarios, an attacker does not need valid credentials to manipulate permissions of existing users, as the vulnerable logic can be invoked via crafted requests to specific URLs.

Centralize authentication and authorization checks for all permission-related operations and require that each such operation validates the caller's identity and role explicitly. Avoid relying on URL endings, implicit assumptions, or indirect indicators of authentication state.

Adopt a consistent access-control architecture where every sensitive action passes through a well-tested authorization layer, enforce least privilege for all roles, and include targeted security reviews and automated checks for endpoints that manage users and permissions as part of your standard development and deployment pipeline.

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