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CVE-2026-92787

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

JWT Signature Bypass (CWE-798) in Feast Authorization

CVE-2026-92787

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authentication and Authorization Bypass

CWE:

CWE-798

Impact:

Critical Authentication Bypass and Unauthorized Data Modification

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Feast through version 0.66.0 fails to verify JWT signatures before using token claims to establish user identity. An attacker may present a specially crafted token with a trusted claim value, bypass role-based access controls, and obtain broad read and write access to server-managed resources.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Feast deployments that use JWT-based authentication and derive user identity or authorization decisions from token claims before confirming token authenticity. It becomes especially risky when the service exposes APIs for entities, feature views, data sources, or permission policies and accepts attacker-controlled tokens without a trusted signing-key verification step.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Feast server APIs protected by JWT-based identity and role-based access control
  • Required access: Ability to send requests to an exposed Feast service; valid credentials may not be required
  • Trigger point: Authentication and identity establishment during request processing
  • Why exploitation is possible: Token claims can be trusted before the token signature is verified, allowing an attacker to impersonate an internal or privileged identity

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an authentication-design failure in which identity claims are consumed before cryptographic validation establishes that the token was issued by a trusted authority. This can allow attacker-controlled claims, including hardcoded or privileged identity values, to influence authorization decisions. The supplied classification maps the issue to CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, while the behavior is also closely related to improper JWT signature validation and authentication bypass.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may bypass role-based access controls
  • Unauthorized users could read entities, feature views, and data sources
  • Attackers could modify feature data or permission policies
  • Data integrity and feature-serving behavior could be compromised
  • The service may be used to establish persistent unauthorized access

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on making cryptographic verification a mandatory prerequisite for identity and authorization decisions.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Verify JWT signatures using trusted keys before reading security-relevant claims
  • Enforce an allowlist of accepted algorithms, issuers, audiences, and token types
  • Reject unsigned, malformed, expired, or otherwise unverifiable tokens by default
  • Separate authentication, token validation, identity mapping, and authorization stages
  • Avoid hardcoded identities, credentials, or privileged claim values
  • Apply least privilege to service accounts and API roles
  • Minimize write permissions for tokens and identities that do not require them

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis rules identifying JWT claims used before signature verification
  • Code review checks for decoded-but-unverified token handling
  • Tests that submit unsigned, incorrectly signed, expired, or wrong-audience tokens
  • Monitoring for requests associated with unexpected internal identities or privilege levels
  • Policy enforcement requiring approved JWT libraries and centralized validation middleware
  • Automated security review tools that flag authentication flows lacking explicit cryptographic verification

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/feast-dev/feast
github.comgithub.com/feast-dev/feast/blob/f296d4b/infra/charts/feast-feature-server/templates/deployment.yaml#L46-L47
github.comgithub.com/feast-dev/feast/blob/f296d4b/sdk/python/feast/permissions/auth/oidc_token_parser.py#L152-L156
github.comgithub.com/feast-dev/feast/blob/v0.66.0/sdk/python/feast/permissions/security_manager.py#L248-L264
github.comgithub.com/feast-dev/feast/issues/6785
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/feast-through-0.66.0-authentication-bypass-via-unverified-token

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, where the Feast server is reachable by an attacker and accepts JWT-based requests without requiring another trusted authentication factor.

Not necessarily. If unverified token claims are accepted as identity, an attacker may be able to impersonate a trusted identity without valid credentials.

Require successful JWT signature and claim validation before establishing user identity or evaluating permissions. Reject tokens that fail any validation step.

Centralize token validation, prohibit use of unverified claims in authorization logic, test negative authentication cases, and enforce least-privilege permissions for all identities.

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