Summary
OpenSlides instances that use SAML single sign-on alongside local logins contain an improper access control bug that allows local authentication to succeed for SAML-synced users with a trivial, shared password.
An attacker who knows or can guess a SAML user's username can bypass the external identity provider and gain direct access to that account through the local login form.
Affected context
This vulnerability affects OpenSlides deployments that:
- Enable local username/password login, and
- Integrate with an external Identity Provider (IdP) via SAML, and
- Synchronize user accounts from the IdP into OpenSlides.
Under these conditions, SAML-synced accounts incorrectly accept a trivial, shared password via the local login form, even though they should be controlled exclusively by the external IdP. The risk is especially pronounced in environments where usernames are predictable (e.g., email addresses, first.last patterns) or discoverable.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Public or internal OpenSlides web login page.
- Required access: Network access to the OpenSlides web interface; no prior authentication is needed.
- Trigger point: Submission of the local login form using the username of any SAML-synced user and the trivially valid shared password.
- Why exploitation is possible: Authorization and authentication logic does not correctly restrict local password-based login for SAML-managed accounts and accepts a fixed, weak credential pattern for all such users, bypassing intended reliance on the external IdP.
Why this happens
The underlying issue is an improper access control and authentication flow design affecting accounts managed via SAML. SAML-synced users are expected to authenticate through the external IdP, with OpenSlides treating them as externally controlled identities. However, the implementation leaves a functional local password-based login path active for these accounts.
Instead of tightly coupling SAML-synced users to SSO-only authentication or enforcing distinct, strong credentials, the system accepts a trivial, shared password for all such usernames through the local login interface. This maps to CWE-284: Improper Access Control, where the authorization boundary between SAML-only and local accounts is not enforced, allowing unintended login methods and bypass of the IdP.
Potential impact
- Attacker can log in as any SAML-synced user whose username is known or guessed.
- Unauthorized access to motions, agendas, and election data tied to compromised accounts.
- Escalation to high-privilege roles (e.g., meeting managers, administrators) if those accounts are SAML-synced.
- Manipulation of assembly processes, including proposals, votes, or projections.
- Exposure of sensitive internal deliberations and participant information.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation usually focuses on hardening the authentication model and clearly separating trust boundaries:
- Constrain authentication paths:
- Ensure that users synchronized from SAML IdPs are strictly SSO-only and cannot authenticate via local username/password.
- Introduce explicit flags or attributes to mark accounts as SSO-managed and enforce that local login is disabled for them.
- Harden credential handling:
- Avoid any use of shared or trivial passwords for groups of accounts, even for temporary or bootstrap scenarios.
- Enforce standard password policies (length, complexity, uniqueness) for accounts that are allowed local login.
- Align with identity provider contracts:
- Treat the IdP as the sole authority for SAML users and avoid local fallbacks that bypass IdP controls.
- Implement configuration options to fully disable local authentication when SSO is mandated by policy.
- Apply least privilege and role review:
- Minimize critical roles on SAML accounts where practical and verify that administrative users are protected by strong SSO requirements.
- Periodically review roles and access rights for SAML-synced users to limit the blast radius of potential compromise.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can use a mix of application-level checks, logging review, and code analysis to detect this class of issue:
- Static and code review signals:
- Look for authentication logic that:
- Applies the same or hard-coded credentials to multiple accounts.
- Does not distinguish between SSO-managed and locally managed users when validating passwords.
- Verify that SAML-specific account types are gated by IdP validation rather than local password checks.
- Configuration and policy checks:
- Implement automated configuration linting to flag when both SSO and local login are enabled without clear separation of account types.
- Enforce organizational policies that prohibit fallback local passwords for SSO-bound users.
- Runtime monitoring and logs:
- Monitor authentication logs for patterns such as:
- Multiple different usernames authenticating successfully from the same IP using identical credentials.
- Successful logins to SAML accounts via local login endpoints.
- Set alerts on any local login activity for accounts flagged as SSO-only.
- Automated security testing:
- Incorporate identity and access control test cases into CI/CD pipelines, using tools or scripts that attempt to authenticate SSO-bound accounts via local paths.

