Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Unrestricted File Upload in EFM ipTIME A6004MX VPN Client

CVE-2026-2550

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unrestricted File Upload

CWE:

CWE-284, CWE-434

Impact:

Remote Code Execution and Full Device Compromise

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

EFM ipTIME A6004MX routers contain an unrestricted file upload vulnerability in the commit_vpncli_file_upload function in /cgi/timepro.cgi, allowing remote attackers to upload arbitrary files without adequate security controls.

When exposed to the internet or untrusted networks, this flaw can enable full compromise of the device if uploaded files are placed in executable paths or otherwise processed by the system.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects ipTIME A6004MX firmware version 14.18.2 where the VPN client file upload handler (commit_vpncli_file_upload in /cgi/timepro.cgi) accepts user-supplied files without sufficient validation or protection.

The risk is highest when:

  • The router's web management interface is reachable from untrusted networks (e.g., WAN/Internet)
  • Default or weak administrative access controls are in place, or the endpoint is exposed without strong authentication
  • Uploaded files are stored in locations that may be executed or interpreted by the system or supporting services

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface of the router, specifically the /cgi/timepro.cgi endpoint handling VPN client file uploads.
  • Required access: Network reachability to the management interface; depending on configuration, this may be from the WAN, internal LAN, or both.
  • Trigger point: Submitting a crafted HTTP request that invokes commit_vpncli_file_upload with an attacker-controlled file.
  • Why exploitation is possible:
  • The upload handler does not sufficiently restrict file type, extension, or content.
  • Authorization or permission checks (CWE-284) around who may upload and what may be uploaded are weak or missing.
  • Uploaded content can persist on the device and may be placed in or moved to locations that the system executes or parses.

Why this happens

The core issue is an unrestricted file upload pattern (CWE-434) combined with improper access control (CWE-284).

The commit_vpncli_file_upload function appears to:

  • Accept file data from user input,
  • Fail to enforce strict checks on file type, filename, extension, or size,
  • Rely on insufficient or misconfigured authorization around who is allowed to upload VPN configuration or related files.

In abstract terms, the handler partially trusts user-supplied files and stores them without robust validation or confinement, creating a path where uploaded content can influence code execution or system behavior.

Potential impact

  • Remote attackers could upload files that enable execution of arbitrary commands on the router.
  • Persistent backdoors or webshell-like mechanisms may be installed on the device.
  • Complete takeover of the router, including modification of DNS, routing, and firewall settings, can occur.
  • Traffic interception, redirection, or man-in-the-middle attacks against connected clients may be enabled.
  • Use of the compromised router as a pivot point for attacks on internal network systems.
  • Enrollment of the device into botnets or participation in distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) campaigns.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on hardening file upload paths and the management interface as a whole, rather than relying on single checks:

  • Enforce strict server-side validation of uploaded files:
  • Allow only known-safe file types and validate via content inspection, not just extension.
  • Normalize and strictly validate filenames, rejecting dangerous patterns or paths.
  • Isolate uploaded files:
  • Store uploads outside of any web-servable or executable directory.
  • Ensure uploads are treated as data only and never directly interpreted as code or scripts.
  • Strengthen access control:
  • Restrict management interface exposure to trusted networks or via VPN-only access.
  • Require strong authentication and session management for any upload-capable endpoints.
  • Apply least privilege:
  • Run web management and file-handling processes with minimal filesystem and system privileges.
  • Limit write permissions to narrowly scoped directories required for the VPN client feature.
  • Implement secure defaults:
  • Disable remote (WAN-side) administration by default, or strictly limit it.
  • Provide configuration options to fully disable VPN client upload features when not needed.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches can combine code-centric review with runtime monitoring:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Flag file upload handlers that:
  • Accept user input via multipart/form-data without robust type and path validation.
  • Write directly to web-accessible or executable directories.
  • Lack clear authorization checks before processing an upload.
  • Look for functions that handle VPN or configuration uploads without explicit extension/content whitelisting.
  • Configuration and policy checks:
  • Periodically audit router and firmware configurations to ensure WAN-side admin access is disabled or strictly controlled.
  • Enforce internal policies requiring authenticated access to file upload endpoints.
  • Runtime monitoring:
  • Monitor device logs (if available) for unusual or high-volume upload activity to /cgi/timepro.cgi.
  • Watch for unexpected files appearing in webroot or system directories.
  • Automated tooling:
  • Use web security scanners configured to probe upload endpoints for weak validation.
  • Apply firmware and source code scanning tools that can highlight CWE-434 and CWE-284 patterns in embedded web administration interfaces.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/LX-LX88/cve-new/issues/3
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?ctiid.346159
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?id.346159
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?submit.749986

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the router's management interface or the /cgi/timepro.cgi endpoint is exposed to the WAN or any untrusted network, attackers can exploit the upload functionality remotely without physical access.

The attacker needs network connectivity to the vulnerable HTTP endpoint and whatever level of authentication the device requires for VPN upload operations. If authentication is weak, misconfigured, or absent, practical exploitation becomes significantly easier.

The most robust pattern is to combine strict server-side file validation (allowlist of types and safe storage locations) with strong access control. Uploads should never be stored in executable or web-served paths, and the feature should only be available to fully authenticated, authorized administrators on trusted networks.

When implementing upload features, treat all file data as untrusted input: enforce strong validation, store files in non-executable locations, and gate the functionality behind hardened authentication and authorization. Additionally, minimize exposed management surfaces, apply least-privilege to services handling uploads, and include automated testing and review focused on CWE-434/CWE-284 patterns in the development lifecycle.

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