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CVE-2026-23843

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

Insecure Direct Object Reference in teklifolustur_app Offer

CVE-2026-23843

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Insecure Direct Object Reference

CWE:

CWE-639

Impact:

Unauthorized Data Access

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in teklifolustur_app allows authenticated users to access quote (offer) records that belong to other users by manipulating the offer_id parameter.

Because authorization checks are missing on the offer view endpoint, any logged-in user who can guess or enumerate offer IDs may be able to read sensitive quote information not intended for them.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in teklifolustur_app's offer viewing functionality, where individual quotes are retrieved based on an offer_id parameter supplied by the client.

The issue manifests when the application:

  • Treats offer_id as a trusted reference to a quote resource
  • Only checks that the user is authenticated, but not that they own or are authorized to view the requested offer
  • Uses predictable or discoverable identifiers for offers

Under these conditions, a user can modify the offer_id in the request and access other users' offers.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) endpoints exposing offer/quote viewing functionality in the web interface or associated APIs.
  • Required access: Valid authenticated session to the application (e.g., regular user account).
  • Trigger point: Client-controlled offer_id parameter (URL query, path segment, or form field) used to directly fetch offer records from the database.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server-side logic verifies that the user is logged in but does not enforce authorization constraints ensuring that the requested offer is owned by, or legitimately accessible to, the current user. The direct use of a user-supplied identifier without a proper ownership or permission check leads to IDOR.

Why this happens

The root cause aligns with CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key.

The application couples resource retrieval directly to a client-supplied identifier (offer_id) and performs only an authentication check, omitting authorization logic that ties the requested record to the current user's identity or role.

This insecure pattern treats object identifiers as opaque and trusted, assuming "logged-in" is sufficient, rather than enforcing that the user is allowed to access that specific object instance.

Conceptually, it is a broken access control issue in which the business rule "users may only see their own offers" is not implemented at the point where the object is queried.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized viewing of other users' offers and associated client details
  • Exposure of sensitive business information such as pricing, discounts, or commercial terms
  • Competitive intelligence leakage if different customers' quotes can be enumerated
  • Privacy violations for clients whose identifying information appears in quotes
  • Potential regulatory or contractual non-compliance due to unintended data disclosure

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing robust, server-side authorization checks for every object-level access:

  • Tie offer retrieval to the authenticated user in database queries (e.g., filter by both offer_id and owner_id or tenant identifier).
  • Implement a consistent access control layer that evaluates whether the current user is permitted to access the requested offer before returning any data.
  • Avoid relying solely on client-side controls (hidden fields, UI filtering, or disabled buttons) to restrict access.
  • Use non-guessable, scoped identifiers where appropriate (e.g., per-tenant IDs or opaque references), while treating them as untrusted input on the server.
  • Centralize authorization logic to reduce the risk of missing checks in individual endpoints and to make policy updates easier.

How teams detect issues like this

IDOR and related access control issues can be detected using a combination of review and testing:

  • Code review: Look for controller or handler code that:
  • Accepts identifiers from the client (e.g., offer_id, quote_id, invoice_id)
  • Fetches records directly by that identifier
  • Only checks for authentication, not ownership, role, or tenant context
  • Static analysis: Configure rules to flag patterns where:
  • User input directly influences database lookups of sensitive objects
  • Authorization checks are absent, inconsistent, or occur after the object has been fetched and sent to the view layer.
  • Dynamic testing: Use manual or automated tests to:
  • Modify identifiers in URLs, forms, or API calls while reusing valid session cookies
  • Verify whether objects belonging to other users or tenants can be accessed.
  • Policy enforcement: Incorporate secure coding guidelines that require explicit authorization for all object-level operations, and integrate automated checks in CI to highlight endpoints that deviate from standardized access control helpers or middleware.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/sibercii6-crypto/teklifolustur_app/commit/dd082a134a225b8dcd401b6224eead4fb183ea1c
github.comgithub.com/sibercii6-crypto/teklifolustur_app/security/advisories/GHSA-6h9r-mmg3-cg7m

Frequently asked

questions

The vulnerability is exploitable by any authenticated user who can interact with the affected offer view endpoint and modify the offer_id parameter. The scope is typically limited to data exposure, but the number of affected records depends on how easily offer IDs can be guessed or enumerated.

No elevated privileges are required. A standard user account is usually sufficient, provided the attacker can send requests with arbitrary offer_id values while authenticated.

The safest pattern is to enforce strict, server-side authorization checks at the point where an offer is retrieved. This typically means filtering by both the offer identifier and a user or tenant identifier, or invoking a centralized authorization mechanism to confirm that the current user is allowed to access the specific offer before returning any data.

Prevention strategies include designing access control as a first-class concern (not an afterthought), centralizing authorization logic, using well-vetted access control middleware or libraries, treating all client-supplied identifiers as untrusted, and incorporating targeted code review and dynamic testing focused on object-level access paths.

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