Summary
TDuck survey form through version 6.0 contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability that lets an authenticated user target form submissions by changing submission identifiers. Under deployments where submission IDs are accepted without verifying ownership or authorization, an attacker may permanently delete submissions belonging to other users.
TDuck survey form through version 6.0 contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability that lets an authenticated user target form submissions by changing submission identifiers. Under deployments where submission IDs are accepted without verifying ownership or authorization, an attacker may permanently delete submissions belonging to other users.
Affected context
The issue occurs in TDuck survey form functionality that processes deletion requests using submission identifiers supplied by the client. It becomes risky when the application relies on a user-controlled identifier and does not consistently verify that the authenticated user is authorized to delete the referenced submission.
The issue occurs in TDuck survey form functionality that processes deletion requests using submission identifiers supplied by the client. It becomes risky when the application relies on a user-controlled identifier and does not consistently verify that the authenticated user is authorized to delete the referenced submission.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Survey submission deletion endpoint
- Required access: An authenticated TDuck user account
- Trigger point: A deletion request containing a selected form key and submission identifier
- Why exploitation is possible: The server may use the supplied object identifier without enforcing ownership or object-level authorization, allowing requests to address submissions outside the user's permitted scope
- Attack surface: Survey submission deletion endpoint
- Required access: An authenticated TDuck user account
- Trigger point: A deletion request containing a selected form key and submission identifier
- Why exploitation is possible: The server may use the supplied object identifier without enforcing ownership or object-level authorization, allowing requests to address submissions outside the user's permitted scope
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authorization failure in object lookup and deletion. The application appears to treat a client-supplied submission ID as sufficient to identify a deletable record instead of binding the lookup to the authenticated user's permissions or the relevant ownership context. This behavior maps to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, a form of insecure direct object reference.
The underlying bug is an authorization failure in object lookup and deletion. The application appears to treat a client-supplied submission ID as sufficient to identify a deletable record instead of binding the lookup to the authenticated user's permissions or the relevant ownership context. This behavior maps to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, a form of insecure direct object reference.
Potential impact
- An attacker may delete other users' survey submissions
- Survey results and historical records could be permanently lost
- Platform-wide data integrity could be reduced
- Operational, reporting, or compliance workflows could be disrupted
- Repeated abuse could cause broad denial of service for submission data
- An attacker may delete other users' survey submissions
- Survey results and historical records could be permanently lost
- Platform-wide data integrity could be reduced
- Operational, reporting, or compliance workflows could be disrupted
- Repeated abuse could cause broad denial of service for submission data
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing object-level authorization at the point where a submission is retrieved or deleted.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Authorizing every submission operation against the authenticated principal and permitted form scope
- Avoiding reliance on client-supplied identifiers as proof of ownership
- Binding object queries to tenant, user, or role constraints before mutation
- Using opaque, non-sequential identifiers as a defense-in-depth measure rather than as the primary authorization control
- Applying least privilege to accounts and service identities that can modify submissions
- Recording and reviewing destructive actions, with recovery controls where appropriate
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing object-level authorization at the point where a submission is retrieved or deleted.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Authorizing every submission operation against the authenticated principal and permitted form scope
- Avoiding reliance on client-supplied identifiers as proof of ownership
- Binding object queries to tenant, user, or role constraints before mutation
- Using opaque, non-sequential identifiers as a defense-in-depth measure rather than as the primary authorization control
- Applying least privilege to accounts and service identities that can modify submissions
- Recording and reviewing destructive actions, with recovery controls where appropriate
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for IDOR risks through:
- Static analysis and code review checks for direct database access using request-provided identifiers
- Review of deletion, update, and download endpoints for missing ownership or tenant predicates
- Authorization tests that compare access to owned and unowned object identifiers
- Policy enforcement requiring object-level authorization before destructive operations
- Monitoring for repeated deletion requests, sequential identifier access, and unusual cross-user activity
Automated application security testing and code review tools may help identify these patterns, but authorization behavior should also be validated with context-aware tests.
Organizations can look for IDOR risks through:
- Static analysis and code review checks for direct database access using request-provided identifiers
- Review of deletion, update, and download endpoints for missing ownership or tenant predicates
- Authorization tests that compare access to owned and unowned object identifiers
- Policy enforcement requiring object-level authorization before destructive operations
- Monitoring for repeated deletion requests, sequential identifier access, and unusual cross-user activity
Automated application security testing and code review tools may help identify these patterns, but authorization behavior should also be validated with context-aware tests.
