Summary
A directory traversal vulnerability in OpenSatKit 2.2.1 allows crafted input to the FileUtil_GetFileInfo function to escape intended directory boundaries.
An attacker who can influence the file path passed to this function may read sensitive files or delete arbitrary files on the underlying system.
Affected context
This vulnerability exists in OpenSatKit 2.2.1 when the FileUtil_GetFileInfo function accepts file path input that is not rigorously normalized or constrained to an expected directory.
It becomes relevant in deployments where user-supplied, network-derived, or otherwise untrusted input can reach this function as a file path parameter.
The issue is most impactful when the process has access to sensitive configuration, log, or system files and has permissions to delete files in accessible directories.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Interfaces (e.g., APIs, command handlers, scripts) that call FileUtil_GetFileInfo with externally influenced path values.
- Required access: Ability to provide or modify the file path argument, such as via a command interface, configuration input, telemetry, or other data channel consumed by OpenSatKit.
- Trigger point: Passing a crafted path containing traversal sequences (for example, patterns that move up directory levels) to FileUtil_GetFileInfo.
- Why exploitation is possible: The function does not sufficiently canonicalize or validate the input path to ensure it remains within an allowed directory scope before performing file operations, enabling traversal outside the intended directory tree.
Why this happens
The underlying issue is a lack of strict path validation and canonicalization before using input in file system operations.
In a directory traversal vulnerability (CWE-22), the application relies on caller-provided paths and fails to enforce that these paths stay within a defined, safe directory hierarchy.
When FileUtil_GetFileInfo processes paths containing traversal components or absolute paths without sanitization, the file operation logic effectively grants the attacker control over which files are accessed or removed, instead of restricting access to a controlled subset of files.
Potential impact
- Reading of sensitive configuration or mission data files the OpenSatKit process can access
- Deletion of arbitrary files within the process's permission scope, potentially disrupting system operation
- Exposure of credentials, cryptographic material, or logs that can aid in further compromise
- Corruption or loss of mission-related data and telemetry, impacting system reliability and integrity
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on constraining and validating all file path inputs before use:
- Normalize and canonicalize paths, then verify they reside under a predefined, whitelisted base directory before any file operation.
- Reject any path containing traversal patterns, unexpected separators, or attempts to reference absolute paths when only relative paths should be allowed.
- Use an allowlist of expected file names or controlled identifiers instead of accepting arbitrary file paths from external input.
- Separate high-privilege file operations from user-controlled inputs and run file-handling components with the least privileges needed.
- Log rejected file access attempts and consider rate-limiting or additional checks for interfaces that accept dynamic file parameters.
How teams detect issues like this
Directory traversal issues can often be detected by combining static and dynamic approaches:
- Static analysis: Search for file system APIs that consume external input, with particular attention to FileUtil_GetFileInfo call sites where arguments are derived from user-controlled or network data.
- Code review: Examine path-handling logic for missing canonicalization, absence of base-directory checks, and lack of allowlisted paths; verify that all error paths and default behaviors are safe.
- Security testing: Use fuzzing or targeted testing tools to supply crafted path values (including traversal sequences) to interfaces that lead to FileUtil_GetFileInfo and observe resulting file access patterns.
- Policy enforcement: Introduce development guidelines that require explicit validation wrappers around file access utilities and enforce them via automated checks where possible.

