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CVE-2026-78799

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Directory Traversal (CWE-22) in IK-Q3000 Wi-Fi Router

CVE-2026-78799

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Directory Traversal

CWE:

CWE-22

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A critical directory traversal vulnerability in the IK-Q3000 enterprise-grade Wi-Fi 6 wireless router may allow a remote attacker to access files outside intended directories.

Under conditions that expose the vulnerable request path, successful exploitation could enable arbitrary code execution on the router.

A critical directory traversal vulnerability in the IK-Q3000 enterprise-grade Wi-Fi 6 wireless router may allow a remote attacker to access files outside intended directories.

Under conditions that expose the vulnerable request path, successful exploitation could enable arbitrary code execution on the router.

Affected context

The issue affects IK-Q3000 deployments using affected iKuai 8 Enterprise or Free Edition builds. It is relevant where a remotely reachable router service processes attacker-controlled file paths without adequately restricting access to the intended directory, potentially allowing traversal into sensitive files or execution-related locations.

The issue affects IK-Q3000 deployments using affected iKuai 8 Enterprise or Free Edition builds. It is relevant where a remotely reachable router service processes attacker-controlled file paths without adequately restricting access to the intended directory, potentially allowing traversal into sensitive files or execution-related locations.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: A remotely reachable router service or management interface handling file-related requests
  • Required access: Network access to the exposed service; authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration
  • Trigger point: Processing of attacker-controlled path or file location input
  • Why exploitation is possible: Insufficient path canonicalization or directory boundary enforcement may allow access beyond the intended directory and create a path toward code execution
  • Attack surface: A remotely reachable router service or management interface handling file-related requests
  • Required access: Network access to the exposed service; authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration
  • Trigger point: Processing of attacker-controlled path or file location input
  • Why exploitation is possible: Insufficient path canonicalization or directory boundary enforcement may allow access beyond the intended directory and create a path toward code execution

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is improper limitation of a user-controlled path, which maps to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal').

The vulnerable pattern occurs when application input is incorporated into filesystem operations without reliably normalizing paths, rejecting traversal components, and confirming that the resolved path remains within an approved directory. If a reachable file-handling or execution mechanism consumes the resulting path, the traversal condition may contribute to arbitrary code execution.

The underlying flaw is improper limitation of a user-controlled path, which maps to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal').

The vulnerable pattern occurs when application input is incorporated into filesystem operations without reliably normalizing paths, rejecting traversal components, and confirming that the resolved path remains within an approved directory. If a reachable file-handling or execution mechanism consumes the resulting path, the traversal condition may contribute to arbitrary code execution.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may read sensitive router configuration or system files
  • An attacker could alter files accessible to the vulnerable service
  • Arbitrary code may be executed with the service's privileges
  • Network traffic, credentials, or connected devices could be exposed
  • The router may be used for persistence, lateral movement, or disruption
  • An attacker may read sensitive router configuration or system files
  • An attacker could alter files accessible to the vulnerable service
  • Arbitrary code may be executed with the service's privileges
  • Network traffic, credentials, or connected devices could be exposed
  • The router may be used for persistence, lateral movement, or disruption

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating unsafe path handling and reducing the consequences of filesystem access.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Canonicalizing paths before authorization checks
  • Allowing only approved filenames or identifiers instead of raw paths
  • Enforcing that resolved paths remain within a designated directory
  • Separating file storage from executable locations
  • Applying least-privilege permissions to router services and files
  • Restricting management interfaces and other administrative services to trusted networks
  • Using secure-by-default configuration that minimizes remotely reachable functionality
  • Reducing input trust through strict validation, allowlists, and boundary checks

Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating unsafe path handling and reducing the consequences of filesystem access.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Canonicalizing paths before authorization checks
  • Allowing only approved filenames or identifiers instead of raw paths
  • Enforcing that resolved paths remain within a designated directory
  • Separating file storage from executable locations
  • Applying least-privilege permissions to router services and files
  • Restricting management interfaces and other administrative services to trusted networks
  • Using secure-by-default configuration that minimizes remotely reachable functionality
  • Reducing input trust through strict validation, allowlists, and boundary checks

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations commonly look for directory traversal risks through:

  • Static analysis patterns involving request parameters passed to filesystem APIs
  • Code review checks for path concatenation, archive extraction, and file download handlers
  • Tests using normalized-path boundary cases and encoded traversal representations
  • Web application firewall or router telemetry rules for traversal indicators
  • Monitoring for unexpected file access, configuration changes, or newly spawned processes
  • Policy enforcement requiring canonicalization and directory containment checks for file operations

Automated security review tools may help identify unsafe path construction, but findings should be validated against the deployment's actual exposure and authorization model.

Organizations commonly look for directory traversal risks through:

  • Static analysis patterns involving request parameters passed to filesystem APIs
  • Code review checks for path concatenation, archive extraction, and file download handlers
  • Tests using normalized-path boundary cases and encoded traversal representations
  • Web application firewall or router telemetry rules for traversal indicators
  • Monitoring for unexpected file access, configuration changes, or newly spawned processes
  • Policy enforcement requiring canonicalization and directory containment checks for file operations

Automated security review tools may help identify unsafe path construction, but findings should be validated against the deployment's actual exposure and authorization model.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/PRISMI-Team/VulnDisclos/blob/main/Routers/iKuai/authorized-path-raversal.md
ikuai8.comikuai8.com/
ikuai8.comikuai8.com/component/download

Frequently asked

questions

The description indicates remote exploitability. Practical exposure depends on whether the affected router service is reachable and whether additional access controls are required.

Not necessarily. The key conditions are network reachability and any authentication or authorization requirements enforced by the affected service.

Enforce strict path validation, canonicalize paths before access checks, verify directory containment, and prevent file-handling logic from reaching executable locations.

Use identifier-based file access where possible, apply least privilege, limit administrative interfaces to trusted networks, and test filesystem operations for traversal and authorization failures.

The description indicates remote exploitability. Practical exposure depends on whether the affected router service is reachable and whether additional access controls are required.

Not necessarily. The key conditions are network reachability and any authentication or authorization requirements enforced by the affected service.

Enforce strict path validation, canonicalize paths before access checks, verify directory containment, and prevent file-handling logic from reaching executable locations.

Use identifier-based file access where possible, apply least privilege, limit administrative interfaces to trusted networks, and test filesystem operations for traversal and authorization failures.

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