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CVE-2025-65783

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Unrestricted File Upload in Hubert Hub uploadFile Component

CVE-2025-65783

Modified

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unrestricted File Upload

CWE:

CWE-434

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

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Summary

An arbitrary file upload flaw in the /utils/uploadFile component of Hubert Imoveis e Administracao Ltda Hub v2.0 1.27.3 allows attackers to upload crafted PDF files that can be processed as executable code by the server.

When file type and content are not strictly validated and stored securely, an attacker may achieve remote code execution through uploaded files that are later interpreted or executed by the application stack.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the file upload handler exposed at /utils/uploadFile within Hubert Hub v2.0 1.27.3.

It is relevant in deployments where:

  • The upload endpoint is reachable over the network (e.g., from the internet or untrusted networks)
  • Uploaded files are stored in locations that can be accessed or processed by the application or underlying services
  • The application assumes files labeled as PDFs are safe without robust server-side validation or transformation

Under these conditions, a crafted file masquerading as a PDF can be treated as executable content, enabling code execution on the server.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible /utils/uploadFile endpoint.
  • Required access: Ability to submit HTTP requests to the upload endpoint; no special privileges are implied by the vulnerability description.
  • Trigger point: Uploading a crafted PDF (or file presented as such) that the server later processes, executes, or exposes in a way that triggers its malicious content.
  • Why exploitation is possible:
  • The upload handler does not sufficiently restrict file types or validate content.
  • Uploaded files are likely stored in a location where they are executed, parsed dangerously, or invoked by downstream components.
  • There is inadequate separation between user-provided files and executable application code or interpreters.

Why this happens

This issue is an instance of CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type.

The upload handler trusts user-supplied files based primarily on extension or superficial checks and allows them to be stored and later processed in a security-sensitive context.

When the backend or associated components treat the uploaded content as executable code (directly or via parsers, plugins, or converters), a crafted "PDF" can embed payloads that lead to arbitrary code execution.

Abstractly, the insecure pattern is:

  • Accepting user-controlled files
  • Failing to enforce strict server-side validation of type, size, and structure
  • Storing or exposing the files in locations where they can be executed or interpreted with elevated privileges.

Potential impact

  • Remote code execution on the application server hosting Hubert Hub
  • Complete compromise of the affected web application
  • Access to sensitive data stored or processed by the application
  • Installation of backdoors or web shells for persistent access
  • Pivoting to other systems within the same network environment
  • Manipulation or destruction of business-critical data

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation patterns generally revolve around tightening file upload handling and isolating uploaded content:

  • Enforce strict server-side content validation using robust MIME-type checking and file format inspection, not just file extensions.
  • Maintain an allowlist of permitted file types with narrowly-scoped, business-justified formats (e.g., specific PDF variants), rejecting all others.
  • Store uploaded files outside of web-accessible or executable directories to prevent direct execution or interpreter invocation.
  • Process uploaded files using non-privileged, sandboxed services with minimal access to the underlying system and other application components.
  • Normalize and, where possible, transform uploaded files into safe intermediary representations before further use.
  • Apply least-privilege configurations for the application user and file system permissions, ensuring uploaded files cannot be executed as code.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect and manage unrestricted file upload issues through a mix of code and operational review:

  • Static analysis: Scan for upload handlers that:
  • Accept arbitrary file extensions or rely solely on client-side checks
  • Write files directly into web root or executable paths
  • Lack content-type validation or format parsing.
  • Code review: Look for:
  • Missing allowlist-based type checks and size limits
  • Direct mapping between uploaded filenames and served URLs
  • Absence of sandboxing or separation between uploaded content and application code.
  • Runtime monitoring:
  • Log and alert on unusual file types or suspicious paths written by upload endpoints
  • Monitor for execution of files from upload directories or unexpected interpreter invocations.
  • Security testing:
  • Incorporate automated and manual penetration testing focused on file upload functionality into regular security assessments.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/carlos-artmann/vulnerability-research/tree/main/CVE-2025-65783

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If the /utils/uploadFile endpoint is exposed over the network, an attacker can exploit it remotely by submitting crafted file upload requests.

An attacker generally only needs the same level of access as a regular user capable of uploading files, which may be unauthenticated if the endpoint is public, or authenticated if uploads require login. No direct system-level access is required.

The most robust pattern is to enforce strict allowlist-based server-side validation of file types and content, store uploads outside any executable or web-served directories, and ensure that any processing of uploaded files occurs in a minimally-privileged, sandboxed environment.

Adopt a standardized upload handling framework that enforces strong validation, safe storage locations, and isolation by default; complement this with secure coding guidelines, code review checklists for upload features, and automated checks in CI pipelines to flag risky file handling patterns.

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