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CVE-2025-64516

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Improper Access Control in GLPI Tickets and Assets

CVE-2025-64516

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Access Control

CWE:

CWE-284, CWE-639

Impact:

Unauthorized Access to Sensitive Documents

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

GLPI, an open-source IT asset and service management platform, contains an access control flaw that allows unauthorized users to retrieve documents attached to tickets, assets, and other items.

When the public FAQ is enabled, this exposure can extend to completely anonymous users, turning internal documents into publicly accessible resources under certain conditions.

Affected context

The vulnerability arises in GLPI instances where documents are attached to objects such as tickets, assets, or other managed items.

It is particularly relevant in environments that use GLPI to store internal or sensitive attachments (for example, logs, configuration exports, or screenshots).

If the public FAQ feature is enabled, the attack surface broadens, as an anonymous user may be able to access these attachments without authentication, depending on how the instance exposes its public-facing endpoints.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web interface / HTTP endpoints used by GLPI to serve attached documents.
  • Required access:
  • In some deployments, basic network access to the GLPI web interface (no account needed if public FAQ is enabled).
  • In other deployments, low-privileged or misconfigured access may be sufficient.
  • Trigger point: Requesting document URLs or endpoints associated with attachments of tickets, assets, or other records.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The access control enforcement for document retrieval is insufficient or incorrectly coupled to the parent item's permissions, allowing document download without verifying that the requester is authorized for the underlying ticket or asset.

Why this happens

The core issue aligns with CWE-284: Improper Access Control, where the application fails to correctly enforce authorization checks before serving protected resources.

Document access appears to be governed by a weaker or separate permission path than the main ticket/asset access control, enabling retrieval of attachments without validating the requester's rights to the associated object.

This behavior is also related to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, since document or object identifiers can be requested directly rather than derived from a strictly authorized context.

Conceptually, the system trusts the presence of a valid document identifier more than it should, instead of consistently re-evaluating whether the current user is entitled to view the parent record and its associated files.

Potential impact

  • Exposure of sensitive internal documents attached to tickets or assets (e.g., logs, screenshots, network diagrams, configuration files).
  • Disclosure of personally identifiable information (PII) related to users, customers, or employees.
  • Leakage of operational details that could aid further attacks, such as system architecture or credentials inadvertently stored in attachments.
  • Breach of contractual or regulatory obligations if confidential or regulated data is stored in GLPI attachments.
  • Erosion of trust and reputational damage if external stakeholders' data is exposed.

General mitigation guidance

A robust mitigation strategy focuses on hardening authorization boundaries around document retrieval and ensuring consistency with parent object permissions.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Ensuring document download endpoints always enforce the same authorization logic as the associated ticket, asset, or item, rather than relying solely on document IDs.
  • Applying a centralized access-control layer that mediates all file and attachment access, so checks cannot be bypassed by alternative URLs.
  • Using indirect references or short-lived tokens for document access that are only generated after successful authorization checks on the underlying object.
  • Minimizing the exposure of public features (such as public FAQ) and ensuring that they operate within clearly segmented permission scopes that never intersect with internal attachments.
  • Applying least-privilege principles in role and profile design to reduce unnecessary access to attachments, even for authenticated users.

These patterns help maintain a clear and enforceable link between an attachment and the permissions of the item it belongs to.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves both code-level and operational approaches:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Identify endpoints that serve files or attachments and verify they invoke centralized authorization checks.
  • Flag patterns where document or file IDs are consumed directly from request parameters without correlating them to a parent object that has been permission-checked.
  • Ensure that public or anonymous routes cannot reference internal document handlers directly.
  • Dynamic and behavioral analysis:
  • Monitor access logs for anomalies such as repeated requests to document URLs from unauthenticated or low-privileged users.
  • Use security testing (including automated web scanners and manual penetration testing) to attempt accessing attachments without the proper role or session.
  • Policy and tooling:
  • Enforce secure coding guidelines that require consistent authorization checks for any resource-serving endpoint.
  • Integrate automated review tools in CI/CD to scan for insecure direct object access and attachment-serving paths.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/glpi-project/glpi/commit/51412a89d3174cfe22967b051d527febdbceab3c
github.comgithub.com/glpi-project/glpi/commit/ee7ee28e0645198311c0a9e0c4e4b712b8788e27
github.comgithub.com/glpi-project/glpi/releases/tag/10.0.21
github.comgithub.com/glpi-project/glpi/releases/tag/11.0.3
github.comgithub.com/glpi-project/glpi/security/advisories/GHSA-487h-7mxm-7r46

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on how the GLPI instance is exposed. In environments where public FAQ access is enabled and reachable from the internet, anonymous users may be able to access attachments. In more restricted deployments, an attacker typically needs at least network access to the GLPI interface and possibly a low-privileged account, depending on configuration.

Not necessarily. If the public FAQ feature is enabled and misaligned with attachment access control, an anonymous user might exploit the flaw. In other configurations, a minimally privileged user with basic access could still reach documents they are not supposed to see.

The most reliable fix is to ensure that every document retrieval request is authorized based on the permissions of the underlying ticket, asset, or item. This typically means routing all attachment access through a central authorization layer that checks the current user's rights before returning any file, and never serving attachments solely based on a document identifier.

Prevention involves designing access control as a first-class concern: consistently enforcing authorization checks in a shared component, avoiding ad-hoc permission checks near endpoints, and treating all identifiers as untrusted input. Combined with secure defaults for public features, thorough code review of resource-serving endpoints, and regular security testing, this significantly reduces the risk of future document exposure vulnerabilities.

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