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CVE-2025-46068

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Unrestricted File Upload in Automai Director

CVE-2025-46068

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unrestricted File Upload

CWE:

CWE-434

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Automai Director 25.2.0 contains an issue in its update mechanism that allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code.

By abusing how update packages or update-related files are accepted and processed, an attacker may be able to upload and run malicious content on the server hosting Automai Director.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the Automai Director 25.2.0 update mechanism, where update artifacts or related files are accepted from a remote source and processed with elevated trust.

It typically manifests when update inputs are not strictly validated, authenticated, or constrained to expected formats and locations.

Environments where the update service is reachable over the network and where the application runs with significant system or application privileges are more exposed to risk, though actual exploitability depends on surrounding access controls and deployment configuration.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-exposed update mechanism or service endpoint of Automai Director.
  • Required access: Ability to interact with the update mechanism (e.g., submit or influence update content); this may be through authenticated access, compromised credentials, or misconfigured endpoints, depending on deployment.
  • Trigger point: Submission, upload, or deployment of a crafted update package or file through the update mechanism, which is subsequently processed by the application.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The update mechanism insufficiently restricts uploaded or supplied content (type, origin, integrity, or execution context), allowing an attacker-controlled file or payload to be stored and ultimately executed as part of the update process.

Why this happens

This issue stems from CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type, in the context of an application update workflow.

The update mechanism appears to trust incoming update artifacts without enforcing strict checks on:

  • File types and formats (e.g., scripts, binaries, or configuration with embedded code)
  • Source authenticity and integrity (e.g., strong signature validation)
  • Storage location and execution privileges

When an update pipeline automatically processes or runs the uploaded content (for installation, unpacking, or scripting), any failure to validate or constrain that content can allow attacker-supplied files to be executed as code within the application or underlying operating system.

Potential impact

  • Remote execution of arbitrary code under the privileges of the Automai Director service.
  • Complete compromise of the Automai Director server, including access to stored data and configuration.
  • Use of the compromised host as a pivot point for lateral movement within the internal network.
  • Tampering with automation workflows, scripts, or monitored systems managed by Automai Director.
  • Deployment of persistent malware or backdoors through seemingly legitimate update operations.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on hardening the update mechanism and strictly controlling what content is accepted and executed:

  • Enforce strong authentication and authorization around all update operations, ensuring only trusted principals can initiate updates.
  • Require cryptographic signing of update packages and verify signatures using trusted keys before any processing or installation.
  • Restrict accepted file types and formats to a minimal, explicitly allowed set, rejecting any unexpected or executable content.
  • Separate storage and execution: store uploaded update artifacts in non-executable locations and copy only verified components into executable paths.
  • Run update processing under least-privilege service accounts, limiting the damage of a compromised update path.
  • Introduce defense-in-depth controls such as application whitelisting and OS-level execution restrictions for directories used by the update subsystem.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue and its potential abuse through a combination of code-level and operational checks:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Identify update-related code paths that accept input over the network or from external sources and write files to disk.
  • Flag any logic that executes or loads content from recently written files (e.g., script interpreters, shell calls, dynamic module loading).
  • Review the presence and enforcement of digital signature verification and strict MIME/extension/type validation for update files.
  • Configuration and policy review:
  • Assess whether update endpoints are unnecessarily exposed to untrusted networks.
  • Verify that update directories are mounted with non-executable permissions where possible.
  • Runtime monitoring:
  • Log and monitor update operations, including the origin of update requests and the files written during update processes.
  • Alert on unusual patterns such as frequent updates from unexpected sources, unexpected file types, or execution of new binaries in update directories.
  • Automated tooling:
  • Use SAST/IAST tools configured to detect unrestricted file upload patterns and dangerous dynamic execution in update pipelines.

Sources

SourceLink
gist.github.comgist.github.com/ZeroBreach-GmbH/00ea6cce1299e1d999b5d1faac4248f1
automai.comautomai.com/

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, the issue is associated with the update mechanism, which can be invoked remotely. Exploitation feasibility depends on whether the update interface is reachable from the attacker's location and what authentication protections are in place.

An attacker generally needs the ability to interact with or influence the update mechanism—for example, network access to the update endpoint, access to credentials that allow starting updates, or control over an upstream source that the system trusts for updates. The specific access tier depends on how the organization has deployed and secured Automai Director.

The safest approach is to treat all update content as untrusted until proven otherwise: require strong cryptographic signing and verification of update packages, strictly validate file types and structure, and ensure that no uploaded content is executed automatically unless it passes all trust checks and resides in controlled execution paths.

Adopt a secure update design from the outset: define clear trust boundaries for update sources, mandate signed updates, keep update endpoints minimally exposed and well authenticated, run update services with least privilege, and integrate security review of update-related code into regular development, code review, and CI security scanning workflows.

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