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CVE-2025-14942

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Authentication Bypass in wolfSSH

CVE-2025-14942

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authentication Bypass

CWE:

CWE-287

Impact:

Credential Disclosure and Authentication Bypass

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A flaw in wolfSSH's key exchange (KEX) state machine can be abused to desynchronize the SSH protocol flow, causing the client to leak its password in cleartext, generate a bogus signature, or skip user authentication entirely.

Client applications using wolfSSH 1.4.21 and earlier are primarily affected, and server applications share the same underlying defect even though no specific server-side exploit has been reported.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in environments where wolfSSH is used as the SSH client or server library, particularly in embedded systems, appliances, or custom applications that rely on wolfSSH for secure remote access.

It becomes relevant when a client engages in an SSH handshake with a potentially malicious or compromised server that can manipulate key exchange messages, or when network traffic can be intercepted and altered.

The defect lies in how the key exchange state machine processes and transitions between protocol states, which can allow protocol messages to be accepted in an unexpected order.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The SSH key exchange and authentication phase between wolfSSH-based clients and SSH servers.
  • Required access: Ability to act as, or position as, a malicious/compromised SSH server, or to perform an active man-in-the-middle attack modifying KEX and authentication messages.
  • Trigger point: During SSH session establishment, when the wolfSSH key exchange state machine processes handshake packets and transitions into authentication.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The state machine does not strictly enforce the expected message sequence and transitions, allowing crafted sequences to cause the client to reveal credentials, accept bogus signatures, or proceed without proper user authentication.

Why this happens

This issue stems from incorrect state management and validation in the key exchange state machine, which fails to strictly bind incoming messages to the protocol's expected sequence and security assumptions.

Instead of enforcing a rigid, protocol-compliant progression from key exchange to authentication, the implementation allows certain messages or transitions to occur in unexpected states.

This behavior maps to CWE-287: Improper Authentication, as the system can accept or bypass authentication steps without consistently verifying that the protocol has reached a valid state, undermining the guarantees of SSH authentication and confidentiality.

Potential impact

  • Client passwords may be exposed in cleartext over the network to an active attacker.
  • An attacker-controlled endpoint can trick the client into sending a bogus or attacker-influenced signature.
  • User authentication can be bypassed, allowing an attacker to establish an SSH session without valid credentials under some conditions.
  • Compromise of systems that trust wolfSSH-based authentication for administrative or sensitive access.
  • Long-term credential compromise if exposed passwords are reused across other systems or services.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation focuses on enforcing strict protocol state handling and reducing trust in remote endpoints during key exchange and authentication.

General defensive patterns include:

  • Hardening the state machine so that every incoming SSH message is validated against a well-defined protocol state, rejecting unexpected or out-of-order messages.
  • Separating key exchange and authentication logic, ensuring that authentication-related messages cannot be processed until key exchange is fully and correctly completed.
  • Treating all remote endpoints as untrusted by default and ensuring that any credential handling (passwords, signatures) only occurs after cryptographic integrity and authenticity of the session is established.
  • Applying least-privilege principles to accounts accessed via SSH, so that a single authentication failure has limited blast radius.
  • Rotating and strengthening credentials that may have been exposed, and favoring key-based authentication with robust verification over password-based logins where possible.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves a combination of code-level analysis and runtime observation:

  • Static analysis: Review state machine implementation for transitions that allow authentication-related actions before the completion of key exchange, or that accept unexpected message types in particular states.
  • Code review signals: Look for complex switch/case structures or state tables where default branches or error handling paths effectively "advance" the state despite unrecognized or malformed messages.
  • Protocol-level tests: Use SSH protocol fuzzing and conformance test suites to send out-of-order or malformed KEX and authentication messages and observe whether the client ever leaks credentials or skips authentication.
  • Logging and monitoring: Enable detailed SSH handshake logging in test environments to capture anomalous sequences leading up to authentication decisions, and use automated tools to flag deviations from the expected SSH flow.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/wolfSSL/wolfssh/pull/855

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. An attacker who can operate a malicious SSH server or position themselves as a man-in-the-middle can send crafted key exchange and authentication messages to exploit the flawed state machine.

Not necessarily. In some scenarios, the attacker's goal is to capture the client's credentials or to cause the client to bypass authentication entirely, which can be achieved without prior knowledge of valid credentials.

Strengthen the protocol state machine to strictly enforce the expected SSH message ordering and transitions, ensure that authentication-related operations cannot occur until key exchange is correctly finalized, and add explicit checks that reject any unexpected or inconsistent message types in each state.

Implement protocol state machines from a formal or well-specified model, add comprehensive unit and integration tests for all state transitions (including negative tests for invalid sequences), perform security-focused code reviews on authentication logic, and use fuzzing or conformance tools to continuously validate behavior against the protocol specification.

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