/

CVE-2023-27753

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.0)

Unrestricted File Upload in MK-Auth 23.01K4.9

CVE-2023-27753

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unrestricted File Upload

CWE:

CWE-434

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.0)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

MK-Auth 23.01K4.9 contains an unrestricted file upload vulnerability that allows attackers to upload arbitrary PHP files to the server.

When a crafted PHP file is accepted and placed in a web-accessible location, an attacker can execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the web server process.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in the portions of MK-Auth 23.01K4.9 that handle user-supplied file uploads.

It is relevant in deployments where uploaded content is stored on the server and made accessible via the web server, and where upload handling does not strictly restrict file types or execution.

The issue manifests when PHP files (or other executable server-side content) can be uploaded and later interpreted by the server as code rather than treated as inert data.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) endpoints in MK-Auth that accept file uploads.
  • Required access: Ability to reach the upload functionality (e.g., via an authenticated or unauthenticated web interface, depending on configuration).
  • Trigger point: Submission of a crafted PHP file through the upload mechanism and subsequent invocation of the uploaded file via a browser or HTTP request.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The upload handler does not sufficiently validate or restrict file types, extensions, or content, and stores uploaded files in a location where the web server executes them as PHP.

Why this happens

The core issue is an unrestricted file upload pattern, mapped to CWE-434.

File upload logic accepts user-supplied files without enforcing strict controls on allowed types, extensions, or execution context.

As a result, server-side executable files (such as PHP scripts) can be uploaded and placed in directories handled by the PHP interpreter, turning what should be data-only uploads into executable code under the web server context.

Potential impact

  • Remote execution of arbitrary PHP code on the server.
  • Full compromise of the MK-Auth application and its data.
  • Theft or modification of configuration files, credentials, and sensitive user information.
  • Use of the server as a pivot point for lateral movement within the network.
  • Deployment of web shells, backdoors, or malware for long-term persistence.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on treating uploaded files as untrusted data and separating them from executable paths.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Restricting uploads to a small, explicit allowlist of file types and validating both MIME type and file extension.
  • Performing server-side content validation (e.g., rejecting files that contain PHP opening tags for uploads that should only be media or documents).
  • Storing uploads outside of web-executable directories and serving them through a handler that treats them as static data.
  • Configuring the web server so that upload directories do not execute server-side scripts.
  • Applying least-privilege permissions to the web server user to limit the impact of any compromise.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-focused review with runtime monitoring.

Potential strategies include:

  • Static analysis rules that flag upload handlers lacking robust checks on file extension, MIME type, and storage location.
  • Manual code reviews that verify upload paths are non-executable and that strict allowlists are in place.
  • Application-level logging and monitoring for suspicious uploads, such as files with script extensions or unexpected content patterns.
  • Web server and WAF rules that detect or block attempts to upload executable content or access atypical script paths in upload directories.
  • Use of automated security testing tools (DAST/SAST) to probe file upload endpoints for unrestricted upload behavior.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/yueslly/MKAUTH-RCE
github.comgithub.com/yueslly/MKAUTH-RCE/blob/main/README.md

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If the file upload interface is reachable over the network, an attacker can exploit this issue remotely by uploading a crafted PHP file and then accessing it.

It depends on how MK-Auth is deployed. If the vulnerable upload endpoint is behind authentication, the attacker would need valid credentials or another way to reach that endpoint; if it is exposed to unauthenticated users, no login is required.

The most robust approach is to restrict uploads to non-executable content, enforce strict allowlists and validation, and ensure uploads are stored in non-executable locations that the web server treats purely as static data.

Design upload features with the assumption that all uploaded data is hostile: enforce strong validation, separate data from code, configure servers to avoid executing files from upload directories, and include security reviews and automated checks for file upload logic in the development lifecycle.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.