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CVE-2018-25158

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Unrestricted File Upload in Chamilo LMS elFinder

CVE-2018-25158

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unrestricted File Upload

CWE:

CWE-434

Impact:

Remote Code Execution by Authenticated Users

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

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Summary

Chamilo LMS 1.11.8 contains an unrestricted file upload vulnerability that allows authenticated users to upload PHP files via the elFinder-based filemanager in the social "myfiles" section.

By disguising PHP code as an image during upload and later renaming it to a PHP extension, an attacker can execute arbitrary code on the server through direct web access to the uploaded file.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in Chamilo LMS 1.11.8 within the elFinder filemanager integration used in the social "myfiles" area.

It manifests when the platform:

  • Allows authenticated users to upload files to web-accessible directories,
  • Performs only superficial checks (such as headers or client-side validation) on uploaded content,
  • Permits subsequent renaming of files to executable extensions (e.g., .php),
  • Serves uploaded files directly via the web server without additional execution controls.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web interface of Chamilo LMS, specifically the elFinder filemanager under the social "myfiles" section.
  • Required access: Valid authenticated user account with permission to upload personal files.
  • Trigger point: Uploading a file containing PHP code but formatted or flagged as an image, then renaming that file to a PHP extension within the filemanager.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The upload pipeline does not adequately restrict executable file types, does not validate content against allowed media types, and stores user-controlled files in directories where the web server executes PHP scripts. The file rename capability completes the bypass of any initial extension-based filtering.

Why this happens

The core issue is an unrestricted file upload pattern, where user-supplied files are accepted and placed into a web-accessible, executable context without robust server-side constraints.

Trusted only on superficial characteristics (e.g., image headers or client-side checks), the upload mechanism allows content that includes PHP code. Because the application then permits renaming the uploaded file to a .php extension and serves it from a location where PHP is executed, the platform effectively enables users to deploy their own server-side scripts.

This aligns with CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type, in which insufficient file type validation and deployment into an executable environment allow code execution rather than treating uploads as inert data.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary PHP code with the privileges of the web server process.
  • Full compromise of the Chamilo LMS application, including user data and course content.
  • Installation of web shells for persistent remote access.
  • Lateral movement to other systems reachable from the compromised server.
  • Data exfiltration, modification, or deletion within the LMS environment.
  • Use of the compromised server as a pivot for further attacks or as part of a malicious infrastructure.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically focuses on constraining what can be uploaded and ensuring uploaded files never become executable code:

  • Enforce strict server-side whitelisting of allowed file types, based on both extension and content (MIME type and magic bytes).
  • Store all user-uploaded files outside of web-executable directories, serving them through indirect handlers that treat them as data only.
  • Disable or tightly control the ability to rename files to executable extensions in filemanager components.
  • Configure the web server to refuse execution of scripts (PHP or otherwise) from upload directories.
  • Apply least-privilege principles to the web server user so that even if files are uploaded, their ability to affect the system is limited.
  • Centralize file upload logic to a hardened component instead of relying on default behavior of third-party file managers.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue and signs of exploitation through:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Identifying upload endpoints that write directly into web-accessible directories.
  • Flagging code that permits arbitrary renaming of uploaded files, especially to script extensions.
  • Checking integrations with filemanager components (like elFinder) for missing file-type and path controls.
  • Configuration review:
  • Verifying that upload directories are marked non-executable at the web server level.
  • Ensuring that file upload policies are enforced consistently across all modules.
  • Runtime monitoring:
  • Logging and alerting on uploads of unexpected file types or subsequent renames to executable extensions.
  • Monitoring HTTP access patterns to upload directories, especially direct requests to newly uploaded files.
  • Automated SAST/DAST and web application security scanners can help highlight permissive upload endpoints and executable upload paths as part of CI/CD or periodic assessments.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/chamilo/chamilo-lms
exploit-db.comexploit-db.com/exploits/47423
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/chamilo-lms-arbitrary-file-upload-via-elfinder

Frequently asked

questions

It is remotely exploitable but requires a valid authenticated account. An attacker can exploit it over the network through the Chamilo LMS web interface once logged in.

The attacker must be an authenticated user with permission to upload files in the social "myfiles" section. No special administrative privileges are inherently required if the upload functionality is available to standard users.

The safest pattern is to treat all uploaded files as untrusted data: strictly limit allowed types, store uploads outside of executable paths, and configure the web server to never execute user-uploaded content. Filemanager modules should be constrained so they cannot create or rename files into executable script types.

Adopt a centralized, hardened upload framework within the application that enforces consistent validation, storage, and serving rules; avoid ad-hoc upload handling in individual modules. Combine this with security-focused code review, automated scanning for upload endpoints, and server configurations that make it impossible for user uploads to be executed as code.

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