Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Improper Pointer Validation (CWE-822) in Zephyr flash_copy

CVE-2026-9771

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Pointer Validation

CWE:

CWE-822, CWE-862

Impact:

Local Privilege Escalation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Zephyr's flash_copy() system call may trust user-controlled device pointers when userspace is enabled, allowing an unprivileged thread to pass forged or invalid kernel object references.

Under those conditions, the kernel may call attacker-chosen function pointers, potentially enabling privilege escalation into supervisor mode, with crashes or information disclosure as additional outcomes.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Zephyr builds with CONFIG_USERSPACE enabled, where z_vrfy_flash_copy() serves as the kernel-side boundary for a userspace caller. Risk is present when the system call accepts src_dev and dst_dev without verifying that they are permitted, registered flash-driver objects before the implementation dereferences their driver API tables.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The userspace-facing flash_copy() system call
  • Required access: An unprivileged local thread able to execute userspace code and invoke the system call
  • Trigger point: Kernel verification of the source and destination device arguments
  • Why exploitation is possible: Missing device-object validation permits user-controlled pointers to reach kernel code that dereferences device structures and invokes their driver API function tables

Why this happens

The verification handler validated the output buffer but did not validate the src_dev and dst_dev pointers with the flash-driver object checks used by sibling system calls. As a result, untrusted pointer values crossed the userspace-to-kernel boundary and were later treated as valid kernel objects.

This maps primarily to CWE-822: Untrusted Pointer Dereference. The related CWE-862: Missing Authorization concern reflects the absence of an authorization-style check confirming that the calling thread may use the referenced flash-driver objects. The insecure pattern is accepting caller-supplied object references without validating object identity, type, registration, and access permissions before dereference or indirect function dispatch.

Potential impact

  • An unprivileged userspace thread may execute code with supervisor-mode privileges
  • The system may experience a kernel crash or denial of service
  • Invalid pointer handling may cause out-of-bounds reads or other memory-safety failures
  • Sensitive kernel or device-related information could be disclosed
  • Other protected system resources may be accessed or modified

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally centers on enforcing a complete kernel object trust boundary for every userspace argument.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Validate every device pointer with the appropriate object-type and driver-permission check before dereference
  • Confirm that referenced objects are registered kernel objects and are authorized for the calling thread
  • Keep pointer validation immediately at the system-call boundary
  • Avoid indirect function-table dispatch until object identity and access checks succeed
  • Apply least-privilege permissions to userspace threads and device capabilities
  • Prefer secure-by-default syscall wrappers that consistently validate all pointer-bearing arguments

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches can include:

  • Static analysis rules identifying system-call handlers that pass userspace pointers directly to implementations
  • Searches for device-structure dereferences or function-table calls without preceding object validation
  • Code review checks comparing each syscall verifier with equivalent sibling handlers
  • Policy enforcement requiring type, registration, and authorization checks for kernel object references
  • Runtime testing with malformed or unauthorized object references to verify rejection without dereference

Automated code review and taint-analysis tools may help identify user-controlled pointers reaching indirect calls.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/1b1ecdc438092cdd469319a0d51cba6cf82e06f4
github.comgithub.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-68cj-3hg4-5vpm

Frequently asked

questions

Generally, no. The described attack requires local execution of userspace code on an affected device, although a separate vulnerability could potentially provide that initial access.

An attacker needs an unprivileged userspace thread capable of invoking flash_copy(). Direct modification of kernel memory or privileged access should not be necessary.

Validate both device arguments at the system-call boundary as authorized, registered flash-driver objects before any dereference or driver API dispatch.

Treat all userspace pointers and object references as untrusted, apply consistent syscall verification helpers, enforce least privilege, and use static analysis and review policies to detect unchecked indirect calls.

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