Summary
SuiteCRM's legacy SOAP portal method portal_get_entry_list uses caller-controlled where and order_by values when constructing SQL queries without sufficient neutralization. A low-privileged portal API user may exploit this to infer database contents through blind SQL injection, alter query behavior, or consume resources.
SuiteCRM's legacy SOAP portal method portal_get_entry_list uses caller-controlled where and order_by values when constructing SQL queries without sufficient neutralization. A low-privileged portal API user may exploit this to infer database contents through blind SQL injection, alter query behavior, or consume resources.
Affected context
The issue occurs in SuiteCRM's legacy SOAP portal API, specifically the portal_get_entry_list method. It affects releases before the corresponding fixes in 7.15.2 and 8.10.2 when caller-controlled where or order_by values reach SQL query construction without adequate neutralization.
The issue occurs in SuiteCRM's legacy SOAP portal API, specifically the portal_get_entry_list method. It affects releases before the corresponding fixes in 7.15.2 and 8.10.2 when caller-controlled where or order_by values reach SQL query construction without adequate neutralization.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The legacy SOAP portal API and its
portal_get_entry_listmethod - Required access: A low-privileged portal API account
- Trigger point: Processing caller-supplied
whereororder_byvalues - Why exploitation is possible: These values are incorporated into SQL construction without sufficient neutralization, allowing blind SQL injection
- Attack surface: The legacy SOAP portal API and its
portal_get_entry_listmethod - Required access: A low-privileged portal API account
- Trigger point: Processing caller-supplied
whereororder_byvalues - Why exploitation is possible: These values are incorporated into SQL construction without sufficient neutralization, allowing blind SQL injection
Why this happens
The method incorporates caller-controlled values into SQL query construction without reliably separating data from SQL syntax. This is an injection flaw mapped to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command. When input is treated as part of a query rather than as data, crafted values may influence the query's behavior.
The method incorporates caller-controlled values into SQL query construction without reliably separating data from SQL syntax. This is an injection flaw mapped to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command. When input is treated as part of a query rather than as data, crafted values may influence the query's behavior.
Potential impact
- An attacker may infer database metadata and sensitive records through blind SQL injection.
- Query behavior could be altered, potentially affecting the results or scope of database operations.
- Crafted requests may consume database or application resources.
- An attacker may infer database metadata and sensitive records through blind SQL injection.
- Query behavior could be altered, potentially affecting the results or scope of database operations.
- Crafted requests may consume database or application resources.
General mitigation guidance
Defensive patterns focus on ensuring caller input cannot alter SQL structure:
- Use parameterized queries for data values and avoid building SQL from raw caller-controlled strings.
- Where dynamic filtering or ordering is required, map inputs to strict allowlists of supported fields and operators.
- Validate inputs against expected types and schemas, while treating validation as a complement to parameterization rather than a substitute.
- Apply least-privilege database permissions and limit the data accessible to portal accounts.
- Restrict portal API exposure and monitor access to legacy endpoints.
Defensive patterns focus on ensuring caller input cannot alter SQL structure:
- Use parameterized queries for data values and avoid building SQL from raw caller-controlled strings.
- Where dynamic filtering or ordering is required, map inputs to strict allowlists of supported fields and operators.
- Validate inputs against expected types and schemas, while treating validation as a complement to parameterization rather than a substitute.
- Apply least-privilege database permissions and limit the data accessible to portal accounts.
- Restrict portal API exposure and monitor access to legacy endpoints.
How teams detect issues like this
- Use static analysis to identify SQL construction that concatenates or interpolates request-controlled values.
- Review query-building code paths for handling of
whereandorder_by, including indirect helpers and legacy SOAP methods. - Apply code review checks and policies requiring parameterized queries and allowlisted dynamic identifiers.
- Monitor database and application logs for unusual portal query patterns, errors, or resource usage.
- Use static analysis to identify SQL construction that concatenates or interpolates request-controlled values.
- Review query-building code paths for handling of
whereandorder_by, including indirect helpers and legacy SOAP methods. - Apply code review checks and policies requiring parameterized queries and allowlisted dynamic identifiers.
- Monitor database and application logs for unusual portal query patterns, errors, or resource usage.
