Summary
The Real Estate Manager – Property Listing and Agent Management plugin for WordPress contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the first_name parameter because input is not sufficiently sanitized and output is not properly escaped. An unauthenticated attacker may inject scripts that execute in the browser of anyone who views the affected page, and the CAPTCHA control may be bypassed by omitting its response parameter.
The Real Estate Manager – Property Listing and Agent Management plugin for WordPress contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the first_name parameter because input is not sufficiently sanitized and output is not properly escaped. An unauthenticated attacker may inject scripts that execute in the browser of anyone who views the affected page, and the CAPTCHA control may be bypassed by omitting its response parameter.
Affected context
The issue occurs in WordPress sites using the Real Estate Manager – Property Listing and Agent Management plugin through version 7.3, where the first_name value can be stored and later rendered in a page without adequate output encoding. Exposure is increased when unauthenticated submissions are accepted and CAPTCHA validation is conditional on the presence of the g-recaptcha-response parameter.
The issue occurs in WordPress sites using the Real Estate Manager – Property Listing and Agent Management plugin through version 7.3, where the first_name value can be stored and later rendered in a page without adequate output encoding. Exposure is increased when unauthenticated submissions are accepted and CAPTCHA validation is conditional on the presence of the g-recaptcha-response parameter.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Public-facing WordPress plugin functionality that accepts or processes the
first_nameparameter - Required access: No authenticated account may be required if the relevant submission path is publicly accessible
- Trigger point: A stored value is later rendered in a page viewed by another user
- Why exploitation is possible: Insufficient input handling and output escaping allow browser-interpreted script content to persist, while CAPTCHA validation is skipped when its response parameter is omitted
- Attack surface: Public-facing WordPress plugin functionality that accepts or processes the
first_nameparameter - Required access: No authenticated account may be required if the relevant submission path is publicly accessible
- Trigger point: A stored value is later rendered in a page viewed by another user
- Why exploitation is possible: Insufficient input handling and output escaping allow browser-interpreted script content to persist, while CAPTCHA validation is skipped when its response parameter is omitted
Why this happens
The underlying bug is a failure to treat user-controlled data as untrusted at both storage and rendering boundaries. The plugin does not apply sufficient context-appropriate sanitization and output encoding to the first_name value, allowing stored script content to be interpreted by a victim's browser. This maps to CWE-79, Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation, commonly known as cross-site scripting.
The underlying bug is a failure to treat user-controlled data as untrusted at both storage and rendering boundaries. The plugin does not apply sufficient context-appropriate sanitization and output encoding to the first_name value, allowing stored script content to be interpreted by a victim's browser. This maps to CWE-79, Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation, commonly known as cross-site scripting.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary JavaScript in a victim's browser
- User sessions or sensitive page data could be exposed
- Administrative actions could be performed in a victim's security context
- Phishing content or deceptive page modifications could be displayed
- Site integrity and user trust could be affected
- An attacker may execute arbitrary JavaScript in a victim's browser
- User sessions or sensitive page data could be exposed
- Administrative actions could be performed in a victim's security context
- Phishing content or deceptive page modifications could be displayed
- Site integrity and user trust could be affected
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in submitted values and
ensuring context-appropriate output encoding.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Validate and constrain name fields using an allowlist appropriate to the expected data
- Apply context-aware output escaping at every HTML, attribute, URL, or script rendering boundary
- Use framework-provided sanitization and escaping APIs rather than assembling markup manually
- Ensure CAPTCHA and authorization checks are enforced independently of optional request parameters
- Limit unauthenticated write access and apply least privilege to plugin and WordPress roles
- Use a restrictive content security policy as a defense-in-depth control
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in submitted values and
ensuring context-appropriate output encoding.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Validate and constrain name fields using an allowlist appropriate to the expected data
- Apply context-aware output escaping at every HTML, attribute, URL, or script rendering boundary
- Use framework-provided sanitization and escaping APIs rather than assembling markup manually
- Ensure CAPTCHA and authorization checks are enforced independently of optional request parameters
- Limit unauthenticated write access and apply least privilege to plugin and WordPress roles
- Use a restrictive content security policy as a defense-in-depth control
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this weakness through:
- Static analysis rules identifying user-controlled values rendered without context-sensitive escaping
- Code review checks for stored fields that flow from request parameters into HTML output
- Tests that submit harmless marker strings containing encoding-sensitive characters and verify safe rendering
- Request-policy checks ensuring anti-automation controls cannot be skipped by omitting optional parameters
- Web application monitoring for unexpected script-like content in property or agent records
Automated security scanning and code review tools may help identify unsafe data flows, but findings should be validated in the application's rendering context.
Organizations can look for this weakness through:
- Static analysis rules identifying user-controlled values rendered without context-sensitive escaping
- Code review checks for stored fields that flow from request parameters into HTML output
- Tests that submit harmless marker strings containing encoding-sensitive characters and verify safe rendering
- Request-policy checks ensuring anti-automation controls cannot be skipped by omitting optional parameters
- Web application monitoring for unexpected script-like content in property or agent records
Automated security scanning and code review tools may help identify unsafe data flows, but findings should be validated in the application's rendering context.
