Summary
Arcane versions before 2.6.0 do not adequately verify privilege relationships when processing delegated user updates. A user holding the delegated users:update permission may change the global administrator's password and authenticate as that account, resulting in complete administrator account takeover.
Arcane versions before 2.6.0 do not adequately verify privilege relationships when processing delegated user updates. A user holding the delegated users:update permission may change the global administrator's password and authenticate as that account, resulting in complete administrator account takeover.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in Arcane's user-management API, specifically when the UpdateUser handler processes password changes. It becomes risky when delegated users are granted users:update access and the application permits them to modify the password hash of a more privileged account without comparing the caller's and target's privilege levels.
The vulnerability occurs in Arcane's user-management API, specifically when the UpdateUser handler processes password changes. It becomes risky when delegated users are granted users:update access and the application permits them to modify the password hash of a more privileged account without comparing the caller's and target's privilege levels.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Arcane user-management API
- Required access: An authenticated account with delegated
users:updatepermission - Trigger point: A password update targeting the global administrator account
- Why exploitation is possible: The handler changes the target password hash without enforcing caller-versus-target privilege checks
- Attack surface: Arcane user-management API
- Required access: An authenticated account with delegated
users:updatepermission - Trigger point: A password update targeting the global administrator account
- Why exploitation is possible: The handler changes the target password hash without enforcing caller-versus-target privilege checks
Why this happens
The underlying issue is improper privilege management. The UpdateUser operation authorizes the general update capability but does not enforce a higher-privilege boundary when the target account is more privileged than the caller. This maps primarily to CWE-266: Incorrect Privilege Assignment, with a related CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management classification, because delegated authority can be used to alter credentials for a protected administrator account.
The underlying issue is improper privilege management. The UpdateUser operation authorizes the general update capability but does not enforce a higher-privilege boundary when the target account is more privileged than the caller. This maps primarily to CWE-266: Incorrect Privilege Assignment, with a related CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management classification, because delegated authority can be used to alter credentials for a protected administrator account.
Potential impact
- An attacker may take over the global administrator account
- Attackers could gain unrestricted control over managed Docker resources
- Container images, networks, and volumes may be exposed or modified
- Administrative credentials or configuration data may be compromised
- The compromised account can be used to create persistence or additional privileged access
- An attacker may take over the global administrator account
- Attackers could gain unrestricted control over managed Docker resources
- Container images, networks, and volumes may be exposed or modified
- Administrative credentials or configuration data may be compromised
- The compromised account can be used to create persistence or additional privileged access
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization boundaries for account-management operations.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Preventing delegated users from modifying credentials of equal- or higher-privilege accounts
- Requiring explicit, separate authorization for administrator password changes
- Applying server-side privilege comparisons rather than trusting client-provided roles
- Separating user-profile updates from credential-management operations
- Running administrative services with least privilege and limiting delegated permissions by default
- Requiring strong reauthentication or independent approval for high-impact account changes
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization boundaries for account-management operations.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Preventing delegated users from modifying credentials of equal- or higher-privilege accounts
- Requiring explicit, separate authorization for administrator password changes
- Applying server-side privilege comparisons rather than trusting client-provided roles
- Separating user-profile updates from credential-management operations
- Running administrative services with least privilege and limiting delegated permissions by default
- Requiring strong reauthentication or independent approval for high-impact account changes
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify similar weaknesses through:
- Static analysis and code review checks for user-update handlers that lack target-privilege comparisons
- Tests covering attempts by delegated users to modify administrator credentials
- Authorization-policy reviews that distinguish self-service updates from privileged account administration
- Audit monitoring for password changes affecting administrator accounts
- Policy enforcement requiring reauthentication or approval for high-impact identity changes
Automated security testing and code review tools may help detect missing authorization checks in account-management paths.
Organizations can identify similar weaknesses through:
- Static analysis and code review checks for user-update handlers that lack target-privilege comparisons
- Tests covering attempts by delegated users to modify administrator credentials
- Authorization-policy reviews that distinguish self-service updates from privileged account administration
- Audit monitoring for password changes affecting administrator accounts
- Policy enforcement requiring reauthentication or approval for high-impact identity changes
Automated security testing and code review tools may help detect missing authorization checks in account-management paths.
