Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

SQL Injection in Student Transcript Processing System Admin

CVE-2026-9575

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-89

Impact:

Data Exposure and Integrity Compromise via SQL Injection

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A SQL injection flaw in the Student Transcript Processing System 1.0 allows crafted input in the ID parameter of /admin/modules/class/index.php?view=view to be concatenated directly into database queries.

When exposed over a network, this enables a remote attacker to interfere with query logic, which may lead to data exposure, modification, or compromise of the underlying database.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in the administrative class-view functionality of the Student Transcript Processing System 1.0, specifically in the /admin/modules/class/index.php?view=view endpoint.

It manifests when the ID parameter is accepted from HTTP requests and used in downstream SQL statements without adequate neutralization, parameterization, or validation.

Deployments that expose the admin interface over a network and do not restrict or authenticate access tightly are more at risk, especially when the database account used by the application has broad privileges.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP interface at /admin/modules/class/index.php?view=view, reachable over the network.
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted requests with a controlled ID parameter; in some setups this may require admin login, in others the endpoint may be insufficiently protected.
  • Trigger point: The server-side logic that builds and executes SQL queries using the ID parameter without proper parameterization or escaping.
  • Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled data is directly merged into SQL statements (CWE-89) and not consistently sanitized or bound as a parameter. This allows the attacker to alter query structure rather than being confined to data-only input.

Why this happens

The core issue is the construction of SQL commands by concatenating or interpolating the ID parameter into query strings without using prepared statements or robust neutralization.

This pattern falls under CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command, where meta-characters such as quotes and operators are not handled safely and can change query semantics.

Because the value is likely derived from HTTP request parameters, it is untrusted input; treating it as trusted and mixing it into SQL logic breaks the separation between code and data at the database layer.

The presence of CWE-74 indicates a broader pattern of improper neutralization of special elements in commands, showing that the application treats external input as part of executable statements rather than data.

Potential impact

  • Exposure of student records, transcripts, and related administrative data from the database.
  • Modification or deletion of academic records, including grades, classes, and transcript entries.
  • Creation of unauthorized administrative accounts or manipulation of authentication-related tables, depending on schema.
  • Potential full compromise of the database server if the application account has extensive privileges.
  • Use of the compromised application database as a pivot point to further attack the underlying infrastructure.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation centers on eliminating direct string concatenation of user input into SQL commands and tightening trust boundaries for administrative endpoints.

Recommended high-level patterns include:

  • Refactoring database access to use parameterized queries or prepared statements for all dynamic inputs, including ID.
  • Introducing a data access layer that enforces strict typing and rejects unsafe query construction patterns.
  • Validating and constraining identifiers to expected formats (e.g., integers or specific UUID patterns) before they reach persistence layers, using allowlists rather than blocklists.
  • Applying least-privilege to the database account used by the application so it can only perform the minimal set of operations necessary.
  • Enforcing strong authentication and authorization on administrative modules and avoiding exposing them directly to the internet where possible.
  • Implementing a centralized input handling policy that standardizes how query parameters and form fields are processed before use.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-centric and behavior-centric approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules to flag dynamic SQL construction where variables derived from HTTP parameters (such as $_GET['ID']) appear inside query strings without binding or escaping.
  • Code review: During manual review, look for direct use of request variables in SELECT, UPDATE, or DELETE statements and lack of a standard database abstraction layer.
  • Policy enforcement: Establish coding standards that prohibit ad-hoc SQL building in controllers and require use of approved database access utilities.
  • Runtime monitoring: Use web application logs or WAF-like tooling to spot suspicious patterns in the ID parameter (e.g., embedded quotes, logical operators, or comment markers) that may indicate injection attempts.
  • Database logging: Enable query logging in lower environments to catch unexpected or malformed queries originating from the admin modules.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/nidieaaa/test/issues/14
itsourcecode.comitsourcecode.com/
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/817580
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/365634
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/365634/cti

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. An attacker who can reach the /admin/modules/class/index.php?view=view endpoint and control the ID parameter can attempt exploitation over the network. In some deployments this may require prior authentication, but the injection itself is triggered remotely.

At minimum, the attacker must be able to send HTTP requests to the affected admin path. If the route is behind a login, they would need valid credentials or another weakness to bypass authentication; if it is exposed or weakly protected, anonymous exploitation may be possible.

Adopt a consistent use of parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions and ensure that all identifiers like ID are handled as typed parameters, not concatenated into SQL strings. Pair this with strict validation of input types and centralized database access logic.

Establish a secure coding guideline that forbids constructing SQL using raw request variables, enforce it through code review and static analysis, and use a well-designed ORM or database abstraction that makes unsafe patterns difficult or impossible. Additionally, limit database privileges and regularly test administrative endpoints with automated security tooling.

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