Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

SQL Injection in Simple POS and Inventory System search.php

CVE-2026-9447

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-89

Impact:

Data Exposure and Manipulation via SQL Injection

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Simple POS and Inventory System 1.0 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in /user/search.php, where the Name parameter is used in database queries without sufficient sanitization.

A remote attacker can manipulate this parameter to interfere with the SQL query logic, potentially accessing or modifying backend data and, in some conditions, escalating their access within the application.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in deployments of SourceCodester Simple POS and Inventory System 1.0 that expose the /user/search.php endpoint over a network.

It is present when user-supplied input from the Name argument is passed into SQL statements without robust server-side validation, parameterization, or escaping.

Typical conditions include a connected relational database, an authenticated or unauthenticated search feature that accepts the Name parameter, and default or custom configurations that do not enforce strong query-building patterns.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) requests reaching /user/search.php
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted requests to the application (authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration)
  • Trigger point: Submission of a specially crafted Name parameter that is incorporated into a SQL query
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application dynamically builds SQL queries using the Name value without using prepared statements or adequate sanitization, allowing attacker-controlled data to alter query structure

Why this happens

This issue stems from constructing SQL queries by directly concatenating user-provided input into query strings.

Instead of treating the Name parameter strictly as data, the application allows it to influence the SQL syntax itself, aligning with CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').

The presence of CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component reflects that user input is not properly neutralized before being passed to the database, a downstream interpreter that executes the resulting SQL command.

The abstract insecure pattern is any code path that builds SQL using string interpolation or concatenation with untrusted input.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may read sensitive data from database tables they are not intended to access.
  • An attacker may modify or delete records, affecting inventory, sales, or user information.
  • An attacker could create or modify user accounts, potentially leading to privilege escalation within the POS application.
  • In some environments, an attacker can leverage the database to run additional commands or pivot to other systems, depending on DBMS configuration and privileges.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that untrusted input cannot alter SQL structure and on constraining database privileges.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Using parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions, ensuring user input is always treated as data.
  • Applying server-side validation and canonicalization on the Name parameter, enforcing expected formats (e.g., character sets, length limits).
  • Avoiding dynamic SQL string concatenation and template-based query building with raw input.
  • Implementing least-privilege database accounts so the application can access only the minimum required tables and operations.
  • Centralizing data-access logic in a well-reviewed data access layer that enforces secure query-building practices by default.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify this class of issue using a combination of automated and manual techniques:

  • Static analysis rules that flag string concatenation or interpolation in SQL query construction, especially involving request parameters like Name.
  • Manual code review focused on data access layers, searching for ad-hoc SQL in PHP files such as /user/search.php.
  • Web application security scanning and fuzzing that probe the Name parameter with SQL-specific payloads and analyze responses and error messages.
  • Enforcement of coding standards that mandate prepared statements and disallow direct inclusion of request variables in SQL strings, backed by CI checks.

Sources

SourceLink
gist.github.comgist.github.com/c4ttr4ck/24c157c90227c3f5cd5e5d871449fed8
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/813614
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/365428
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/365428/cti
sourcecodester.comsourcecodester.com/

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. An attacker who can reach the /user/search.php endpoint over the network can attempt to exploit the issue by manipulating the Name parameter.

It depends on how the application is deployed and configured. If /user/search.php is accessible without authentication or with low-privilege accounts, an external attacker may exploit it directly; otherwise, a valid user session may be required.

The most robust pattern is to use parameterized queries or prepared statements everywhere, combined with strict server-side validation of input and removal of any ad-hoc SQL construction with concatenated user input.

Establish secure coding guidelines that require parameterized queries, enforce them via code review and automated static analysis, limit database privileges, and incorporate regular security testing of input-handling endpoints into the development lifecycle.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.