Summary
ArcadeDB contains an access-control weakness affecting TimeSeries types because ACL resolution relies on bucket identifiers that these types do not use in the same way as ordinary records. An authenticated low-privilege user may therefore read or insert TimeSeries samples despite explicit deny rules when the relevant permission lookup fails open.
Affected context
The issue occurs in ArcadeDB deployments that use security-group ACL entries for TimeSeries types. It becomes risky when a low-privilege authenticated user can access a TimeSeries endpoint or operation and the ACL resolver derives permissions from record-bucket identifiers rather than the associated type name. In that situation, deny rules may not be applied as intended.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Authenticated database operations involving TimeSeries data
- Required access: A valid account with low privileges and access to relevant database functionality
- Trigger point: Reading or inserting TimeSeries samples
- Why exploitation is possible: Permission resolution depends on bucket IDs, while TimeSeries types do not own normal record buckets, causing the type-specific lookup to fail open
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authorization mapping failure. ACL evaluation builds permissions from bucket identifiers, but TimeSeries types require a type-name-based authorization path because they do not use ordinary record buckets. When the expected lookup cannot resolve the type, the access decision does not reliably enforce an explicit denial. This behavior maps to CWE-863, Incorrect Authorization, because the system fails to apply the intended permission policy to a protected operation.
Potential impact
- An attacker may read TimeSeries samples outside their authorized scope.
- An attacker could insert unauthorized samples or alter the integrity of time-series data.
- Monitoring, analytics, or operational decisions could be based on manipulated data.
- Unauthorized data access could contribute to confidentiality or compliance impacts.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on making authorization decisions independent of storage-specific identifiers and ensuring that every protected type has an explicit, fail-closed policy path. Common defensive patterns include resolving ACLs consistently by canonical type identity, denying access when permission resolution is incomplete, and testing explicit allow and deny rules for TimeSeries operations. Access should be limited through least-privilege roles, restrictive defaults, and reduced trust in client-supplied type or resource identifiers. Authorization checks should remain centralized and should occur before data reads or writes.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can include static and architectural analysis of ACL resolvers for bucket-only permission lookups, missing-resource fallbacks, and fail-open authorization branches. Code review should look for differences between ordinary record authorization and specialized data types such as TimeSeries. Dynamic tests can verify that low-privilege identities are denied both read and insert operations when explicit deny rules are present. Policy enforcement and automated security review tools can flag authorization paths that lack fail-closed behavior.

