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CVE-2026-93292

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.5)

SQL Injection (CWE-89) in SigNoz Trace-Funnel API Endpoints

CVE-2026-93292

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Unauthorized Database Query Execution and Data Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

SigNoz contains a SQL injection vulnerability in trace-funnel analytics endpoints because service and span names are interpolated into ClickHouse string literals without escaping. An authenticated attacker may inject SQL through funnel step definitions, execute arbitrary queries, and read returned results over HTTP.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in SigNoz deployments that expose trace-funnel analytics endpoints and process attacker-influenced funnel step definitions. It becomes risky when an authenticated user can submit service_name or span_name values that reach ClickHouse queries without adequate parameterization or escaping.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Authenticated HTTP trace-funnel analytics endpoints
  • Required access: Valid application credentials or another permitted authenticated session
  • Trigger point: Processing funnel step definitions containing service_name or span_name values
  • Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled values are interpolated into ClickHouse string literals without sufficient escaping or parameter binding

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an unsafe construction of database queries from untrusted application data. When service_name and span_name values are inserted directly into ClickHouse SQL string literals, attacker-controlled delimiters and expressions may alter the intended query structure. This behavior maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command, commonly known as SQL injection.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute unauthorized ClickHouse queries
  • Sensitive trace, metric, or application data could be disclosed in HTTP responses
  • Database contents may be altered or deleted if the database account permits those operations
  • Query performance could be degraded through resource-intensive statements
  • Downstream analytics and operational decisions could be affected by manipulated data

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally centers on preventing user-controlled values from becoming executable SQL syntax.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Use parameterized queries or supported query-builder abstractions for all dynamic values
  • Apply strict input trust reduction through allowlists, length limits, and expected-format validation
  • Treat identifiers and filter values as data rather than concatenated query fragments
  • Use database accounts with only the read and schema permissions required by analytics features
  • Ensure query results and error responses expose no unnecessary sensitive information
  • Add regression tests covering quote characters, malformed values, and unexpected query expressions

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for SQL injection risks through:

  • Static analysis rules identifying string concatenation or interpolation in database queries
  • Code review checks for dynamic SQL construction involving request or form fields
  • Tests that verify parameter binding is used for service, span, and other filter values
  • Runtime monitoring for anomalous ClickHouse statements, repeated query errors, and unusually broad result sets
  • Database audit policies that record query activity by application identity and flag unexpected statement patterns
  • Automated code review or application security testing tools that inspect query-building paths

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/SigNoz/signoz
github.comgithub.com/SigNoz/signoz/blob/v0.142.0/pkg/modules/tracefunnel/clickhouse_queries.go#L498-L499
github.comgithub.com/SigNoz/signoz/blob/v0.142.0/pkg/query-service/app/http_handler.go#L4081-L4086
github.comgithub.com/SigNoz/signoz/commit/8286e787b296b291a26a14d20407a335fcfbac25
github.comgithub.com/SigNoz/signoz/commit/8e00c0405697659bd4994a5de446cf3028c0f76d
github.comgithub.com/SigNoz/signoz/releases/tag/v0.142.1
github.comgithub.com/SigNoz/signoz/security/advisories/GHSA-w5pf-xwjh-vr5v
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/signoz-0.88.0-before-0.142.1-sql-injection-in-trace-funnel-analytics-query-builders

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable through the network if the trace-funnel analytics endpoints are reachable and the attacker has valid authentication.

The described attack requires an authenticated account capable of submitting or modifying funnel step definitions. The effective scope also depends on endpoint authorization and database permissions.

Use parameterized ClickHouse queries or a trusted query abstraction, and ensure user-controlled values are never concatenated into SQL syntax.

Combine parameterized query enforcement with strict input validation, least-privilege database accounts, focused code review, regression testing, and monitoring for anomalous database activity.

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