Summary
cc-connect through version 1.5.0 does not apply per-user allowlist checks when processing Feishu interactive card callbacks. An attacker who can trigger a card action in an admitted chat may dispatch agent commands despite controls that protect the text-message handler.
Affected context
The issue occurs in deployments using cc-connect's Feishu integration when interactive card actions are accepted from chats that are admitted at the chat level. The onCardAction callback path may lack the per-user allowlist enforcement applied to ordinary text messages, allowing authorization decisions to differ between message types.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Feishu interactive card callback handling
- Required access: Ability to participate in or trigger actions within an admitted chat
- Trigger point: The
onCardActionhandler processes an interactive card callback - Why exploitation is possible: The callback path does not consistently enforce the per-user allowlist before dispatching agent commands
Why this happens
The vulnerability results from inconsistent authorization enforcement across equivalent input paths. The text-message handler applies per-user allowlist filtering, while the interactive card callback handler can dispatch commands based on chat admission without applying the same user-level decision. This represents CWE-863, Incorrect Authorization, because a protected operation is reachable without validating the caller's permission in every relevant execution path.
Potential impact
- An unauthorized user may dispatch agent commands
- Attackers could cause actions to be performed under the agent's privileges
- Sensitive information may be exposed through unauthorized commands
- Connected systems or workflows could be modified
- Abuse could affect other users or resources accessible to the agent
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on applying authorization consistently at the
point where agent commands are dispatched.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Reusing a single centralized authorization check for text and card-action paths
- Enforcing per-user allowlists after resolving the callback identity and before command dispatch
- Treating chat admission as insufficient without user-level authorization
- Applying least privilege to the agent and its integrations
- Denying access by default when callback identity or authorization state is missing
- Recording authorization decisions and rejected callback attempts for review
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches commonly include:
- Static analysis and code review checks for command dispatches lacking shared authorization middleware
- Comparing authorization behavior across message, callback, webhook, and interaction handlers
- Tests that exercise admitted and non-admitted users through every supported event type
- Policy enforcement requiring authenticated user identity and allowlist checks before agent execution
- Runtime monitoring for agent commands originating from interactive callbacks or unexpected users
Automated code review tools may help identify authorization checks that are missing or inconsistently applied.

