Summary
Angel through version 3.3.0 deserializes untrusted setAlgoMetrics payloads with Kryo without class registration or allowlist validation. An unauthenticated network attacker may instantiate unintended classes or exhaust coordinator memory by sending crafted serialized objects to the master RPC endpoint.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in Angel deployments where the master RPC endpoint accepts setAlgoMetrics requests and processes their serialized payloads with Kryo. Risk is increased when the endpoint is network-reachable by untrusted clients and deserialization is performed without class registration, an allowlist, or equivalent input constraints.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Angel master RPC endpoint
- Required access: Network connectivity to the endpoint; authentication is not required according to the vulnerability description
- Trigger point: Processing of a crafted serialized
setAlgoMetricspayload - Why exploitation is possible: Kryo deserializes attacker-controlled object data without restricting permitted classes, allowing unintended object construction or resource-intensive processing
Why this happens
The underlying bug is unsafe deserialization: attacker-controlled serialized data is treated as a trusted object graph. Kryo is used without class registration or an allowlist that limits the types eligible for reconstruction. This insecure pattern maps to CWE-502 because deserialization can invoke object construction behavior and consume resources before the input has been adequately constrained.
Potential impact
- An attacker may instantiate unintended classes within the Angel coordinator process.
- The coordinator may consume excessive memory and become unavailable.
- The master service could experience degraded performance or denial of service.
- Unexpected object behavior could affect application integrity or operational stability.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing trust from serialized RPC inputs and
restricting the object types that can be reconstructed.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Prefer explicit, schema-driven data formats and simple data-transfer objects over native object deserialization.
- Enforce strict class registration or a narrowly defined allowlist when Kryo or a similar serializer is required.
- Validate payload size, nesting depth, collection limits, and field values before resource-intensive processing.
- Require authentication and authorization for administrative or coordinator RPC operations.
- Run coordinator services with least privilege and apply resource limits to reduce denial-of-service impact.
- Keep RPC endpoints isolated from untrusted networks where practical.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this weakness through:
- Static analysis rules identifying deserialization of network-controlled data without registration or allowlist checks.
- Code review signals such as generic Kryo readers, native object reconstruction, and missing payload limits.
- RPC inventory reviews that identify unauthenticated endpoints accepting serialized object graphs.
- Runtime monitoring for unusual
setAlgoMetricsrequest rates, oversized payloads, memory growth, and coordinator restarts. - Policy enforcement requiring schema validation, type restrictions, authentication, and resource bounds for RPC services.
Automated code review and software composition analysis tools may help identify related patterns, but should be supplemented with service-level testing.

