Summary
Yeti through version 2.11.0 contains an authorization flaw in an RBAC deletion endpoint. A read-only user may remove access relationships, which could lock out resource owners and disrupt administrative control.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in Yeti deployments using the affected RBAC deletion endpoint through version 2.11.0. It becomes risky when the endpoint permits read-only identities to perform deletion actions that should be restricted to authorized owners or administrators.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The application's RBAC access-management deletion endpoint
- Required access: An authenticated account with read-only privileges
- Trigger point: A request that removes an access relationship
- Why exploitation is possible: Authorization checks do not adequately
distinguish read-only capabilities from relationship-management privileges
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authorization design failure in which a protected state-changing operation is available to an identity with insufficient privileges. This maps to CWE-862, Missing Authorization, because the endpoint does not reliably enforce the permission required to delete RBAC relationships. The insecure pattern is treating authentication or general read access as sufficient authorization for destructive access-control changes.
Potential impact
- A read-only user may remove access relationships
- Resource owners could be locked out of managed objects
- Administrative recovery and operational workflows could be disrupted
- Unauthorized changes to authorization state could weaken governance controls
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at every state-changing
endpoint and applying deny-by-default rules.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Require explicit relationship-management or administrative privileges for deletion
- Validate authorization server-side for the specific resource and requested action
- Keep read-only permissions separate from mutation permissions
- Apply ownership and administrative-boundary checks before changing access relationships
- Use least-privilege service identities and narrowly scoped role definitions
- Add confirmation, auditability, and recovery controls for destructive RBAC changes
- Treat client-supplied role or ownership claims as untrusted until verified
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify similar issues through:
- Static analysis and policy rules for authorization checks on mutation endpoints
- Code review of route handlers, middleware, and service-layer permission decisions
- Tests that exercise every endpoint with read-only, owner, administrator, and
unauthenticated identities
- API-gateway or service-mesh policies restricting destructive RBAC operations
- Audit-log monitoring for relationship deletions performed by low-privilege accounts
- Automated security review tools that detect missing or inconsistent authorization

