Summary
Rundeck does not adequately authorize certain parameters in the project archive import endpoint. An attacker who is permitted to perform project imports may be able to replace security-relevant project configuration, potentially altering how jobs execute and which credentials or nodes they access.
Affected context
The issue affects Rundeck deployments that allow users or integrations to import project archives while granting the import action without separately restricting configuration parameters such as importConfig and importNodesSources. Risk is higher when imported project files control node executors, SSH key paths, or other settings used during job execution.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The project archive import endpoint
- Required access: Permission to perform the project import action
- Trigger point: Processing an archive containing project configuration or node-source content
- Why exploitation is possible: Authorization for the import operation is not sufficiently separated from authorization to replace security-sensitive configuration parameters
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authorization-boundary failure. Rundeck permits an identity with the general import capability to influence configuration files and node-source settings without adequately verifying whether that identity is authorized to modify each security-relevant parameter.
This maps to CWE-862: Missing Authorization, in which an application performs a sensitive action without enforcing the required permission check for the specific resource or operation. The insecure pattern is treating a broad import privilege as permission to overwrite all imported project settings.
Potential impact
- Attackers may alter project configuration used by job execution.
- Jobs could run through attacker-selected node executors or connection settings.
- Configured SSH key paths or related credential references may be redirected.
- Unauthorized changes could enable access to additional systems or data.
- Project integrity, operational reliability, or audit trust could be reduced.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at the parameter and resource level rather than relying on a broad import permission.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Separating permission to import project content from permission to change security-sensitive configuration.
- Applying allowlisted schemas and immutable defaults to executor, credential-reference, and node-source settings.
- Treating imported archives as untrusted input and requiring explicit review or approval for privileged fields.
- Restricting project-import permissions to trusted administrators and minimizing service-account privileges.
- Preventing configuration values from selecting arbitrary credential or key locations.
- Maintaining strong audit logging and change control for project archive imports.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and authorization reviews that compare endpoint actions with field-level permission checks.
- Code review searches for archive extraction or configuration replacement paths that lack per-resource authorization.
- Tests that submit imports containing privileged configuration fields under accounts with only basic import access.
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected changes to project configuration, node sources, executors, or credential references.
- Policy enforcement requiring approval, restricted roles, or signed archives for privileged project imports.
Automated application-security review tools may help identify endpoints where broad permissions govern sensitive configuration changes.

