Summary
CMAK does not install an effective cross-site request forgery protection filter, allowing a malicious website to submit state-changing requests through an authenticated operator's browser. If an operator is authenticated with HTTP Basic authentication or a CMAK session cookie, attackers may trigger actions such as topic deletion or cluster configuration changes without the operator intentionally initiating them.
Affected context
The vulnerability affects CMAK administrative interfaces through version 3.0.0.6 when they are accessed by authenticated operators using browsers that automatically attach authentication credentials or cookies to requests. Risk is higher when administrative endpoints accept state-changing requests without anti-CSRF validation and when authentication cookies lack appropriate SameSite protections.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: CMAK web-based administrative endpoints
- Required access: The victim must be authenticated as an operator in a browser session
- Trigger point: A malicious page or embedded form causes the browser to submit a state-changing request
- Credential condition: The browser automatically sends HTTP Basic authentication credentials or the CMAK authentication cookie
- Why exploitation is possible: The application does not reliably verify that state-changing requests originated from its trusted interface
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is the absence of effective cross-site request forgery protection on administrative actions. CMAK accepts requests that change topics or cluster configuration without requiring a request-bound anti-CSRF token, trusted-origin validation, or an equivalent control. This maps to CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery, where an application performs a state-changing operation based only on ambient browser authentication.
Potential impact
- An attacker may delete Kafka topics through a victim operator's browser
- An attacker could alter cluster configuration
- Data availability or integrity may be affected
- Administrative actions may be performed without the operator's informed consent
- Operational disruption or follow-on compromise could result from unauthorized configuration changes
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that authenticated state-changing requests contain proof of intent from the trusted application context.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Applying synchronizer tokens or signed double-submit tokens to all state-changing requests
- Enforcing trusted-origin or same-origin checks for administrative operations
- Using SameSite cookie attributes where compatible with the authentication model
- Requiring explicit confirmation and appropriate request methods for destructive actions
- Separating read-only and administrative privileges, and limiting operator permissions
- Avoiding reliance on ambient HTTP Basic authentication alone for high-impact browser actions
- Requiring reauthentication or step-up authorization for particularly destructive operations
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify CSRF exposure through:
- Static analysis rules that flag state-changing routes lacking anti-CSRF middleware or request validation
- Code review checks for administrative endpoints that accept browser-authenticated requests without origin or token verification
- Dynamic testing that evaluates whether cross-origin requests can reach destructive operations while a user is authenticated
- Policy enforcement requiring CSRF defenses on non-idempotent methods and administrative routes
- Inspection of authentication cookie attributes, including SameSite, Secure, and HttpOnly settings
Automated application security testing and code review tools may help identify missing protections, but results should be validated against the application's authentication and deployment model.

