Summary
Quickwit through version 0.9.0 does not sufficiently validate the host and scheme supplied in the queue_url parameter for SQS file sources. An attacker who can access the source-creation API may cause a node to send requests to arbitrary internal addresses, enabling network discovery and service fingerprinting.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in Quickwit deployments that use SQS file sources and expose an API capable of creating or configuring those sources. It becomes risky when user-controlled queue_url values are accepted without strict validation of the destination host and scheme, and when the Quickwit node can reach internal or otherwise restricted network services.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The create-source API or another interface that accepts SQS file-source configuration
- Required access: Permission or access sufficient to submit a source definition
- Trigger point: Processing the supplied
queue_urlwhile establishing or testing the SQS source - Why exploitation is possible: Host and scheme validation does not adequately constrain outbound requests, allowing attacker-influenced destinations and observable connection responses
Why this happens
The underlying issue is insufficient destination validation for a server-side request feature. The application treats a user-controlled queue URL as a trusted network destination without enforcing an appropriate allowlist or restricting supported schemes and hosts. This maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, where an application makes network requests on behalf of an attacker and may expose internal connectivity or service behavior.
Potential impact
- Internal network addresses may be scanned from the Quickwit node
- Restricted services may be fingerprinted through connection-response differences
- Network topology and service exposure may be inferred
- Requests may reach administrative or otherwise unintended internal endpoints
- Availability or logging impact may occur on targeted internal services
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in destination URLs and limiting the network capabilities of the Quickwit process.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Accepting only explicitly supported schemes and validating URLs with a strict parser
- Restricting destination hosts to an approved SQS endpoint allowlist
- Resolving hostnames and rejecting loopback, link-local, private, reserved, and otherwise disallowed address ranges
- Rechecking resolved destinations to reduce DNS-rebinding exposure
- Separating configuration submission from outbound network access where practical
- Applying egress network policies and least-privilege service permissions
- Avoiding detailed connection errors that reveal internal service behavior
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations commonly detect SSRF risks through:
- Static analysis rules for outbound requests built from user-controlled URLs
- Code review checks for missing scheme, host, redirect, and private-address validation
- API policy enforcement requiring approved destination domains
- Egress monitoring for unexpected connections to private, loopback, link-local, or metadata-service address ranges
- Alerting on unusual source-creation activity and repeated connection failures across internal address ranges
- Automated security review tools that identify unvalidated network destinations

