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CVE-2026-92717

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

Missing Authentication (CWE-306) in Covenant SignalR Hub

CVE-2026-92717

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Unauthorized API Access and Sensitive Data Exposure

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Covenant through 0.6 exposes the CovenantHub SignalR hub without requiring authentication, allowing unauthenticated callers to invoke sensitive functionality and obtain a signed JWT.

An attacker who obtains this token may authenticate to the operator API and access sensitive operational data, including grunts, credentials, binaries, events, and operator information.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Covenant deployments through version 0.6 where the CovenantHub SignalR endpoint is registered without an authorization requirement. The risk is present when the hub is reachable by an attacker and its unauthenticated token-generation functionality remains available. Exposure may be increased when the operator API and SignalR service are accessible beyond a tightly controlled administrative network.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The CovenantHub SignalR endpoint and its associated operator API
  • Required access: Network reachability to the SignalR hub; no valid credentials are required for the initial interaction
  • Trigger point: Invocation of the unauthenticated hub method that creates an HTTP listener and returns a signed JWT
  • Why exploitation is possible: The hub lacks an effective authorization boundary, allowing unauthenticated callers to obtain a token accepted by broader operator API services

Why this happens

The underlying bug is a missing authentication enforcement mechanism on a sensitive SignalR hub. A hub method capable of issuing a signed token is exposed without an Authorize attribute or an equivalent policy check, causing the application to treat unauthenticated requests as trusted.

This maps to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function, where a security-sensitive operation can be reached without first establishing the caller's identity and authorization. The resulting token trust relationship extends the impact beyond the original endpoint.

Potential impact

  • Unauthenticated attackers may obtain a token accepted by the operator API
  • Attackers could access or enumerate grunts and operator roster information
  • Sensitive credentials, binaries, and operational events may be exposed
  • Attackers may use authorized API capabilities to alter operational state
  • The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the Covenant environment may be compromised

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authentication and authorization consistently across every hub and sensitive method.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Requiring authenticated identities before exposing token-issuing or listener-management functions
  • Applying explicit authorization policies to SignalR hubs and individual sensitive operations
  • Avoiding tokens with broader privileges than the originating request requires
  • Restricting operator API and hub exposure to trusted administrative networks or access proxies
  • Using least-privilege roles, short-lived credentials, and auditable token validation
  • Separating administrative interfaces from publicly reachable application surfaces
  • Failing closed when authorization metadata or policy evaluation is absent

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations commonly detect missing authentication through:

  • Static analysis for hub or controller methods that lack authorization metadata
  • Code review checks for token issuance, listener creation, and administrative operations
  • Integration tests that verify anonymous requests are rejected at both hub and API boundaries
  • Route and endpoint inventory reviews comparing exposed methods with required access policies
  • Gateway or service-mesh policies that restrict administrative SignalR and API traffic
  • Monitoring for anonymous hub connections, unexpected token issuance, and unusual operator API access

Automated security review tools can help identify sensitive endpoints that are reachable without an authentication or authorization decision.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cobbr/Covenant
github.comgithub.com/cobbr/Covenant/blob/v0.6/Covenant/Core/CovenantService.cs#L3958-L3975
github.comgithub.com/cobbr/Covenant/blob/v0.6/Covenant/Hubs/CovenantHub.cs#L28-L33
github.comgithub.com/cobbr/Covenant/issues/406
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/covenant-through-0.6-missing-authentication-on-the-covenanthub-signalr-hub

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, when the CovenantHub SignalR endpoint is network-reachable. The initial interaction does not require an authenticated account.

An attacker generally needs network access to the exposed SignalR hub. Valid Covenant credentials are not required to obtain the token described by this vulnerability.

Require authentication and explicit authorization before any token-issuing or administrative hub method can execute, and ensure issued tokens have narrowly scoped privileges.

Maintain an endpoint authorization inventory, apply default-deny policies, test anonymous access paths in CI, and monitor administrative interfaces for unexpected unauthenticated activity.

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