Summary
TDuck survey forms through version 5.3 do not adequately validate webhook URLs or confirm that the requesting user owns the target form. An authenticated attacker may attach a webhook to another user's form and redirect survey submissions to attacker-controlled, internal, or otherwise unauthorized destinations.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in TDuck's survey webhook configuration workflow when the WebhookConfigController accepts a webhook URL without sufficient destination validation and does not enforce form ownership. Deployments are at risk where authenticated users can configure webhooks and survey submissions contain sensitive or restricted information.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Authenticated survey webhook configuration functionality
- Required access: A valid TDuck account with access to the webhook configuration workflow
- Trigger point: Creating or modifying a webhook associated with a survey form
- Why exploitation is possible: The controller may accept arbitrary webhook destinations and fail to verify that the requester owns the selected form, allowing submissions to be forwarded to unauthorized external or internal addresses
Why this happens
The underlying bug combines insufficient server-side URL validation with a missing object-level authorization check. The application trusts a user-supplied destination and form reference without reliably constraining outbound requests or confirming ownership. This maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, because attacker-influenced server-side requests can reach unintended destinations, while the ownership failure broadens which data can be redirected.
Potential impact
- Survey submissions may be exfiltrated to attacker-controlled endpoints
- Sensitive responses could be disclosed across user or tenant boundaries
- The server may make requests to internal or otherwise restricted addresses
- Internal services could receive unauthorized traffic from the TDuck host
- Downstream systems may be exposed to forged webhook requests
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization and reducing trust in webhook destinations.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Verify server-side that the requester owns, or is explicitly authorized to manage, the referenced form
- Apply strict allowlisting for permitted webhook schemes, hosts, ports, and network zones
- Resolve and recheck destinations to prevent access to loopback, link-local, private, and other restricted ranges
- Use a controlled outbound proxy or egress policy for webhook delivery
- Avoid forwarding sensitive submission fields unless they are required and appropriately protected
- Apply least-privilege identity and network permissions to the webhook delivery component
- Revalidate webhook configuration at creation time and before each delivery
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this issue through:
- Static analysis rules for user-controlled URLs passed to HTTP clients
- Code review checks for missing ownership or object-level authorization on form identifiers
- Tests covering cross-user form references and unauthorized webhook updates
- Egress monitoring for requests to private, loopback, link-local, or unexpected external destinations
- Policy enforcement requiring webhook destinations to match approved schemes and host allowlists
- Automated application security review tools that identify SSRF sinks and authorization gaps

