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CVE-2026-92602

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

SSRF (CWE-918) in TDuck Survey Webhook Controller

CVE-2026-92602

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery

CWE:

CWE-918

Impact:

Unauthorized data exfiltration and server-side request forgery

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

TDuck survey forms through version 5.3 do not adequately validate webhook URLs or confirm that the requesting user owns the target form. An authenticated attacker may attach a webhook to another user's form and redirect survey submissions to attacker-controlled, internal, or otherwise unauthorized destinations.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in TDuck's survey webhook configuration workflow when the WebhookConfigController accepts a webhook URL without sufficient destination validation and does not enforce form ownership. Deployments are at risk where authenticated users can configure webhooks and survey submissions contain sensitive or restricted information.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Authenticated survey webhook configuration functionality
  • Required access: A valid TDuck account with access to the webhook configuration workflow
  • Trigger point: Creating or modifying a webhook associated with a survey form
  • Why exploitation is possible: The controller may accept arbitrary webhook destinations and fail to verify that the requester owns the selected form, allowing submissions to be forwarded to unauthorized external or internal addresses

Why this happens

The underlying bug combines insufficient server-side URL validation with a missing object-level authorization check. The application trusts a user-supplied destination and form reference without reliably constraining outbound requests or confirming ownership. This maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, because attacker-influenced server-side requests can reach unintended destinations, while the ownership failure broadens which data can be redirected.

Potential impact

  • Survey submissions may be exfiltrated to attacker-controlled endpoints
  • Sensitive responses could be disclosed across user or tenant boundaries
  • The server may make requests to internal or otherwise restricted addresses
  • Internal services could receive unauthorized traffic from the TDuck host
  • Downstream systems may be exposed to forged webhook requests

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization and reducing trust in webhook destinations.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Verify server-side that the requester owns, or is explicitly authorized to manage, the referenced form
  • Apply strict allowlisting for permitted webhook schemes, hosts, ports, and network zones
  • Resolve and recheck destinations to prevent access to loopback, link-local, private, and other restricted ranges
  • Use a controlled outbound proxy or egress policy for webhook delivery
  • Avoid forwarding sensitive submission fields unless they are required and appropriately protected
  • Apply least-privilege identity and network permissions to the webhook delivery component
  • Revalidate webhook configuration at creation time and before each delivery

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this issue through:

  • Static analysis rules for user-controlled URLs passed to HTTP clients
  • Code review checks for missing ownership or object-level authorization on form identifiers
  • Tests covering cross-user form references and unauthorized webhook updates
  • Egress monitoring for requests to private, loopback, link-local, or unexpected external destinations
  • Policy enforcement requiring webhook destinations to match approved schemes and host allowlists
  • Automated application security review tools that identify SSRF sinks and authorization gaps

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/TDuckCloud/tduck-survey-form
github.comgithub.com/TDuckCloud/tduck-survey-form/blob/9ad4e2dc75cdff5eacc8be0c73f0d4db3c265d43/tduck-webhook/src/main/java/com/tduck/cloud/webhook/controller/WebhookConfigController.java#L43-L47
github.comgithub.com/TDuckCloud/tduck-survey-form/blob/9ad4e2dc75cdff5eacc8be0c73f0d4db3c265d43/tduck-webhook/src/main/java/com/tduck/cloud/webhook/service/sender/WebhookSenderService.java#L84-L100
github.comgithub.com/TDuckCloud/tduck-survey-form/issues/40
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/tduck-survey-form-through-5.3-server-side-request-forgery-via-unvalidated-webhook-url

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, within the application's authenticated attack surface. An attacker generally needs an account capable of reaching the webhook configuration workflow.

The vulnerability is specifically associated with inadequate form ownership verification, so a separate authorization path to the victim's form may not be enforced. The exact scope depends on deployment roles and other access controls.

Enforce server-side ownership or explicit authorization checks for every referenced form, and restrict webhook destinations through URL validation, host allowlisting, and network egress controls.

Treat webhook URLs and object identifiers as untrusted input, test cross-user authorization boundaries, monitor outbound traffic, and apply least-privilege access to both application data and network resources.

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