Summary
AVideo's get_api_video endpoint may return videos restricted to user groups when an anonymous caller provides a public video slug through the clean_title branch. The response can also expose sensitive owner details, including email, phone, address, birth date, and administrator status.
Affected context
The issue occurs in AVideo deployments using the get_api_video endpoint when video lookup by public slug reaches the clean_title branch without applying the video's user-group authorization requirements. Risk is higher when anonymous requests are permitted and API responses include owner profile fields or administrative attributes.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The publicly reachable get_api_video API endpoint - Required access: No authenticated account may be required - Trigger point: A request that identifies a video through its public slug and
reaches the clean_title lookup path
- Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint may locate the video without
consistently enforcing group-based authorization before returning content
and owner information
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authorization decision failure in which resource lookup and response generation are not reliably coupled to the video's access control policy. A public identifier is treated as sufficient for retrieval, while group restrictions and field-level privacy controls are not enforced for anonymous callers. This behavior maps to CWE-639, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, because attacker-controlled resource identifiers can be used to access records outside the caller's permitted scope.
Potential impact
- Unauthorized users may view videos restricted to particular groups.
- Personal information belonging to video owners could be disclosed.
- Email addresses, phone numbers, addresses, and birth dates may be exposed.
- Administrator status and other sensitive account attributes could be revealed.
- The vulnerability could enable privacy violations, targeted social engineering, or regulatory exposure.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization server-side for every resource lookup, including requests using public slugs or other user- controlled keys. Access checks should occur before content or metadata is serialized, and response schemas should use secure-by-default field allowlists that exclude sensitive owner attributes unless explicitly authorized. Group membership should be evaluated using trusted server-side identity and policy data rather than request-controlled values. Anonymous identities should receive the minimum permitted response, and service accounts should operate with only the privileges needed to query approved resources.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can include static analysis and code review for endpoint branches that query records by user-controlled identifiers without a nearby authorization check. Reviewers can look for response serializers that expose profile or administrative fields to unauthenticated callers, as well as authorization performed after data retrieval. Dynamic testing should compare anonymous, authorized, and unauthorized responses for group-restricted resources, including alternate lookup parameters such as slugs. API policy enforcement can require authorization and response-field tests for every resource endpoint, while automated security review tools may help identify missing access-control paths.

