Summary
DataGear through version 6.0.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the /dataSet/preview/Http endpoint. An unauthenticated attacker may supply a caller-controlled URI to make the server issue HTTP requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, or other reachable destinations and return their response bodies.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in DataGear deployments exposing the /dataSet/preview/Http endpoint when user-supplied request destinations are accepted without sufficient authentication, destination validation, or network egress controls. Risk is higher when the server can reach internal administrative services, cloud instance metadata services, or other sensitive resources that are not directly accessible to external users.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The
/dataSet/preview/Httpserver-side HTTP request functionality - Required access: No authentication may be required when the endpoint is exposed
- Trigger point: Processing a caller-supplied URI through the HTTP preview operation
- Request capabilities: The endpoint may support GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, or DELETE operations
- Why exploitation is possible: The server sends requests to attacker-selected destinations and returns response bodies without adequately restricting schemes, hosts, ports, methods, or network locations
Why this happens
The underlying bug is a failure to treat caller-controlled request destinations as untrusted input. A server-side HTTP client uses a supplied URI without enforcing a narrowly defined destination policy, allowing the application to act as a network proxy for external users.
This behavior maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, where an attacker influences a server into sending requests to unintended systems or services. The risk is amplified when response content is disclosed and when state-changing HTTP methods are permitted.
Potential impact
- An attacker may access internal services that trust network location
- Cloud instance metadata or temporary credentials could be disclosed
- Sensitive response bodies could be returned to an unauthenticated requester
- Internal APIs may receive unauthorized state-changing requests
- Network segmentation and administrative access boundaries could be weakened
- The vulnerability could support further compromise of applications or infrastructure
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing arbitrary destination control from server-side request features and enforcing a secure, explicit allowlist.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Restricting requests to approved schemes, hosts, ports, and paths
- Resolving hostnames and validating final IP addresses before connecting
- Blocking loopback, link-local, private, reserved, and metadata-service address ranges
- Disabling unnecessary request methods and response-body forwarding
- Revalidating destinations after redirects and preventing DNS-rebinding bypasses
- Requiring authentication and authorization for preview functionality
- Applying outbound network policies and least-privilege service identities
- Separating request-proxy functionality from sensitive network zones
- Returning only the minimum response data needed by the feature
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches commonly include:
- Static analysis for HTTP client calls that receive URLs from request parameters
- Code review checks for missing host, scheme, port, redirect, and IP-range validation
- Dynamic testing with controlled internal, loopback, private-range, and metadata-service destinations
- Web application firewall or API gateway policies restricting suspicious destination parameters
- Egress monitoring for unexpected connections from DataGear processes
- Audit logging of requested destinations, methods, response sizes, and authorization context
- Automated security review tools that identify SSRF-prone data flows

