Summary
A missing ownership check in the zlt2000 microservices-platform file-center module allows authenticated users to delete files they do not own. If an attacker can enumerate file identifiers through the file listing endpoint, they may submit another user's identifier and remove the associated file and metadata.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in deployments using the file-center module through version 6.0.0, specifically the DELETE /files/{id} endpoint. Risk is present when authenticated users can access file listings, obtain valid identifiers, and the deletion handler does not verify that the requested file belongs to the requesting user or an authorized administrative scope.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The file-center HTTP API, including
GET /filesandDELETE /files/{id} - Required access: A valid authenticated account with access to the file-center module
- Trigger point: A deletion request containing a file identifier associated with another user
- Why exploitation is possible: The delete operation performs no effective ownership or authorization validation before removing the file and related metadata
Why this happens
The underlying defect is an object-level authorization failure mapped to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key. The endpoint trusts a client-supplied file identifier as sufficient authority to perform a destructive operation, without checking whether the authenticated principal owns the referenced object or has an explicitly authorized role. This insecure pattern allows identifiers obtained through otherwise permitted API behavior to cross user or tenant boundaries.
Potential impact
- Authenticated users may delete files belonging to other users
- File metadata may be removed without the owner's authorization
- Business records or user-generated content could become unavailable
- Data integrity and availability may be affected
- Repeated abuse could support denial-of-service or destructive account activity
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally centers on enforcing server-side, object-level authorization for every destructive request.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Deriving the effective user or tenant scope from the authenticated session rather than request parameters
- Checking ownership or explicit administrative permission before processing deletion
- Applying consistent authorization policies to file listing, retrieval, update, and deletion operations
- Using opaque, non-sequential identifiers where appropriate, while treating them as non-authoritative for access control
- Restricting administrative privileges and separating tenant data through defense-in-depth controls
- Returning consistent responses that avoid exposing whether unauthorized identifiers exist
- Recording and reviewing destructive actions for anomaly detection and accountability
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify this class of issue through:
- Static and API analysis for resource handlers that use user-controlled identifiers without authorization checks
- Code review of every endpoint that reads, modifies, or deletes objects by ID
- Tests that attempt cross-user and cross-tenant access using valid authenticated sessions
- Policy enforcement requiring an authorization decision before destructive database or storage operations
- Monitoring for unusual rates of file deletion, identifier enumeration, or deletions across multiple ownership scopes
- Automated security review tools that flag missing object-level access-control checks

