Summary
A server-side request forgery vulnerability in A2UI's FileResolver can cause the application to make HTTP requests to attacker-selected destinations.
When remotely supplied or insufficiently restricted file references reach the resolver, an attacker may access internal services or retrieve resources from the server's network context.
Affected context
The issue occurs in the A2UI Python agent's FileResolver component, specifically in the file resolution path that uses httpx.get. It may become risky when externally influenced file or resource locations are passed to this resolver without sufficiently restricting destination schemes, hosts, ports, or network ranges.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: A remotely reachable application feature that invokes the FileResolver
- Required access: Access to submit or influence a file or resource reference consumed by the resolver
- Trigger point: Processing the supplied reference through the HTTP request operation
- Why exploitation is possible: The server makes outbound requests using attacker-influenced destination data without adequate destination allowlisting or network-boundary enforcement
Why this happens
The vulnerability is caused by treating an externally influenced URL or resource location as an acceptable outbound HTTP destination.
When the FileResolver passes that value to an HTTP client without robust validation of the scheme, hostname, port, and resolved network address, the server can be induced to connect to locations that the attacker may not be able to reach directly. This behavior maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery.
Potential impact
- An attacker may probe internal network services
- The application could retrieve sensitive internal resources
- Cloud or platform metadata may be exposed where network access permits
- Internal endpoints could receive unintended requests
- The server's network position could enable further attacks against trusted services
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in user-controlled destinations and enforcing outbound network boundaries.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Allowing only explicitly approved schemes, hosts, ports, and resource types
- Resolving hostnames and validating resulting addresses against private, loopback, link-local, and other restricted ranges
- Rechecking destination addresses after redirects and preventing unsafe redirect chains
- Using an outbound proxy or egress policy with deny-by-default rules
- Separating file retrieval from sensitive application and metadata networks
- Applying least-privilege identity and network permissions to the service
- Returning controlled errors without exposing fetched content or internal response details
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis rules for HTTP client calls that consume request-derived URLs
- Code review checks for missing scheme, host, port, redirect, and IP-range validation
- Tests covering private addresses, loopback targets, link-local ranges, alternate numeric address forms, and redirects
- Egress monitoring for unexpected requests from the FileResolver process
- Network policy enforcement and alerts for connections to restricted address spaces
- Automated security review tools that identify user-controlled data flowing into outbound request APIs

