Summary
lamp-cloud permits anonymous access to an annotation endpoint that returns the server's JVM system property map. An unauthenticated attacker may obtain classpaths, filesystem locations, operating system details, and startup-related secrets when the affected endpoint is exposed.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in lamp-cloud deployments where the path pattern for the annotation API is covered by an anonymous-access whitelist. The affected endpoint can disclose JVM properties without first establishing an authenticated session, making the issue particularly risky when the service is reachable by untrusted users or from the public internet.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The lamp-cloud annotation API, including the properties endpoint
- Required access: Network connectivity to the exposed service; authentication is not required
- Trigger point: A request to the endpoint that returns JVM system properties
- Why exploitation is possible: Access-control rules permit anonymous requests to a resource that exposes sensitive runtime configuration
Why this happens
The underlying issue is a missing authentication check on a sensitive information endpoint. A broad anonymous-access path pattern includes the annotation API, allowing requests to reach functionality that should be protected by an authenticated authorization boundary. This maps to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function, because the application fails to verify the identity of a caller before providing privileged runtime information.
Potential impact
- An attacker may learn JVM classpaths and application deployment details.
- Filesystem paths and operating system information could support further attacks.
- Startup secrets or other sensitive system properties may be disclosed.
- Exposed configuration data could enable credential theft, service targeting, or lateral movement.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on protecting sensitive diagnostic and configuration endpoints by default.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Require authentication and authorization for endpoints that expose runtime properties or diagnostics.
- Replace broad anonymous-access path patterns with narrowly scoped, explicitly approved public routes.
- Apply deny-by-default access policies and review all whitelist exceptions.
- Reduce the trust and sensitivity of returned data by filtering secrets, paths, classpaths, and environment-specific properties.
- Run services with least-privilege identities and avoid placing credentials in JVM properties where feasible.
- Use secure-by-default deployment configurations that do not expose administrative or diagnostic APIs externally.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify similar issues through:
- Static analysis and configuration checks for anonymous route whitelists covering administrative, diagnostic, or data-disclosure endpoints.
- Code review searches for access-control middleware bypasses and overly broad wildcard path patterns.
- Integration tests that verify unauthenticated requests receive denial responses for sensitive endpoints.
- Web application firewall or API gateway policies that restrict diagnostic routes to trusted networks and authenticated clients.
- Runtime monitoring for anonymous requests to annotation, debugging, configuration, or system-information APIs.
- Automated security review tools that flag missing authentication and excessive endpoint exposure.

