Summary
Flowise does not consistently enforce workspace-level authorization for its openai-realtime endpoints. An authenticated user who supplies an unscoped chatflow identifier may access tools belonging to another workspace, invoke them, and potentially retrieve sensitive outputs or trigger external side effects.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in Flowise deployments using the openai-realtime endpoints when authorization is not bound to the authenticated user's workspace. It becomes risky when an attacker can obtain or guess a ChatFlow identifier and the endpoint accepts that identifier without confirming that the referenced ChatFlow and its tools belong to the user's authorized workspace.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The openai-realtime GET and POST endpoints
- Required access: An authenticated Flowise account
- Trigger point: Supplying a chatflow identifier that belongs to another workspace
- Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint may resolve tools using an unscoped identifier without enforcing workspace ownership or membership authorization
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an object-level authorization failure. The endpoint uses a client-supplied ChatFlow identifier to retrieve or execute tools but does not reliably verify that the referenced object belongs to the authenticated user's workspace. This maps to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, in which a user-controlled lookup key can expose or operate on resources outside the user's permitted scope.
Potential impact
- Unauthorized users may retrieve tool definitions from other workspaces
- Attackers could execute tools configured by victim workspaces
- External systems or services may be affected by unintended tool actions
- Sensitive tool outputs or connected data may be disclosed
- Cross-tenant confidentiality and integrity could be compromised
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at the resource boundary rather than trusting identifiers supplied by clients.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Resolve ChatFlows and tools through the authenticated user's workspace context
- Enforce server-side ownership or membership checks for every GET and POST operation
- Use deny-by-default authorization policies for cross-workspace resource access
- Avoid exposing predictable or reusable resource identifiers as the sole access control mechanism
- Apply least privilege to tools and the external services they can access
- Record and review cross-workspace authorization failures and tool invocations
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and code review checks for database lookups driven only by client-supplied identifiers
- Review signals showing missing workspace, tenant, or ownership predicates in endpoint handlers
- Authorization tests that attempt access to equivalent resources across workspace boundaries
- API gateway or policy enforcement that requires tenant context for resource operations
- Monitoring for authenticated users invoking ChatFlows or tools outside their normal workspace
- Automated security review tools that identify insecure direct object reference patterns

