Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

Missing Authentication (CWE-306) in NI grpc-device

CVE-2026-9142

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Unauthorized Access to Device Services

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

NI grpc-device uses insecure default credentials when TLS is not configured and the server is exposed beyond the loopback interface, leaving the service effectively unauthenticated on the local network.

In this configuration, an unauthenticated user on the same network may be able to access and interact with the grpc-device server as if they were a trusted client.

Affected context

The vulnerability appears when NI grpc-device is deployed without TLS configuration and the service is bound to a network-accessible interface (e.g., 0.0.0.0 or a non-loopback IP).

In environments where the service is reachable from the local network, and default security assumptions are left unchanged, the server may accept connections without enforcing proper authentication.

This typically affects lab, test, or production setups where grpc-device is intended for remote control or automation but has not been hardened with explicit security settings.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The NI grpc-device gRPC endpoint exposed over the local network.
  • Required access: Network-level access to the host/interface where grpc-device is listening (e.g., same LAN, VPN, or routed segment).
  • Trigger point: Connecting to the service when TLS is not configured and the server is bound beyond loopback.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The service relies on insecure defaults and does not enforce authentication under the described configuration, allowing unauthenticated sessions.

Why this happens

The issue stems from insecure defaults in the authentication and transport security configuration of NI grpc-device.

When TLS is not explicitly configured and the server is allowed to listen on non-loopback interfaces, the service operates without robust identity verification for connecting clients.

This aligns with CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function, where a network-exposed service provides sensitive or privileged operations without requiring authenticated access under certain deployment conditions.

Potential impact

  • An unauthenticated user could access device control or measurement functions provided by grpc-device.
  • Attackers may be able to read or manipulate sensitive test, measurement, or configuration data.
  • Malicious commands could disrupt experiments, production tests, or hardware operation.
  • Unauthorized use of the service could facilitate further lateral movement within the local network.

General mitigation guidance

Defensive patterns focus on enforcing strong authentication and secure defaults for network-exposed services:

  • Configure TLS explicitly and require authenticated channels for all network-accessible deployments.
  • Bind grpc-device only to loopback interfaces when remote access is not strictly necessary.
  • Place the service behind authenticated gateways or bastion hosts when remote control is required.
  • Apply network segmentation and firewall rules so only trusted hosts can reach the grpc-device port.
  • Run the service with least-privilege permissions and restrict what operations unauthenticated or low-trust contexts can perform.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection usually involves validating configuration, deployment posture, and network exposure:

  • Review grpc-device configuration for TLS enablement and interface binding, flagging instances listening on non-loopback interfaces without encryption.
  • Use network scanning and service discovery to identify grpc-device endpoints reachable from broader network segments.
  • Incorporate configuration-as-code or policy checks that prevent deploying grpc-device without authentication when exposed beyond loopback.
  • During security code reviews, look for assumptions about "trusted networks" and lack of explicit authentication enforcement around device control operations.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/ni/grpc-device/security/advisories/GHSA-fhhw-37q8-6562
ni.comni.com/en/support/security/available-critical-and-security-updates-for-ni-software/2026/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-ni-grpc-device-server.html

Frequently asked

questions

It is primarily exploitable from the local or routed network where the grpc-device service is exposed. Internet-scale exploitation depends on whether the host is directly reachable from the internet or via misconfigured VPN or port forwarding.

An attacker needs network-level access to the interface and port where NI grpc-device is listening. No prior authentication is required in the affected configuration.

Enforce authenticated, encrypted channels by configuring TLS and ensuring the service does not accept unauthenticated connections when bound beyond loopback. Additionally, restrict the listening interface and apply network controls so only authorized clients can reach the service.

Adopt secure-by-default configurations for any device-control or automation service, mandate authentication for all network-accessible endpoints, and integrate configuration checks into deployment pipelines to block unauthenticated or unencrypted exposures.

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