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CVE-2026-90944

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.2)

Missing Authentication (CWE-306) in Krayin CRM Inbound

CVE-2026-90944

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Unauthorized CRM data and conversation manipulation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Krayin CRM exposes its inbound mail parsing endpoint without requiring authentication, allowing unauthenticated attackers to submit crafted email messages. This may let attackers inject arbitrary subjects, bodies, sender details, and replies into the CRM inbox or existing conversation threads.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Krayin CRM deployments where the inbound mail parsing route is reachable through the application and does not enforce authentication before processing submitted RFC 2822 messages. Risk is higher when the endpoint is publicly accessible or when inserted messages are trusted by support, sales, or workflow processes.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The HTTP POST /admin/mail/inbound-parse endpoint
  • Required access: No authenticated account is required when the endpoint is exposed
  • Trigger point: Submission and processing of a crafted email message
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application accepts inbound mail content and associated metadata without first verifying the caller's identity and authorization

Why this happens

The underlying issue is a missing authentication control on a function that changes application-managed communication records. This maps to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function, because the inbound mail processing operation can be invoked without establishing that the requester is an authorized mail service or user. Trusting caller-supplied sender information and headers can further amplify the integrity impact.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may inject fraudulent or misleading messages into CRM inboxes
  • Existing conversation threads could be altered with unauthorized replies
  • Support or sales workflows may act on forged sender information
  • Users may be exposed to phishing, spam, or social-engineering content
  • CRM communication records and audit context could lose integrity

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on protecting inbound mail processing as an authenticated, narrowly scoped integration function.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Require strong service authentication and authorization before accepting inbound messages
  • Restrict the endpoint to trusted mail gateways or controlled network paths where practical
  • Validate message structure and treat sender fields, headers, and thread identifiers as untrusted
  • Use secure-by-default rejection for unauthenticated, malformed, replayed, or unauthorized submissions
  • Separate mail-ingestion privileges from broader CRM administrative privileges
  • Record provenance and security-relevant events for accepted and rejected messages

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this weakness through:

  • Static and dynamic analysis of routes that process or modify CRM records
  • Code review checks for state-changing endpoints without authentication and authorization middleware
  • API inventories that identify publicly reachable administrative or integration routes
  • Policy enforcement requiring authenticated service identities for inbound mail handlers
  • Monitoring for unusual volumes, forged sender domains, unexpected headers, or unauthorized thread updates
  • Automated security review tools that flag unauthenticated sensitive endpoints

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/krayin/laravel-crm
github.comgithub.com/krayin/laravel-crm/blob/v2.2.6/bootstrap/app.php
github.comgithub.com/krayin/laravel-crm/blob/v2.2.6/packages/Webkul/Admin/src/Routes/Admin/mail-routes.php
github.comgithub.com/krayin/laravel-crm/issues/2560
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/krayin-crm-through-2.2.6-unauthenticated-email-injection-via-inbound-parse

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, when the inbound parsing endpoint is reachable by an attacker and does not require authentication. Network exposure and deployment controls determine the practical scope.

No authenticated CRM account is required under the vulnerable condition. The key requirement is network access to the exposed endpoint.

Require strong authentication and authorization for inbound mail processing, restrict trusted integration paths, and validate all message metadata before creating or modifying CRM records.

Inventory all state-changing routes, enforce authentication by default, apply explicit authorization policies to integration endpoints, and monitor for anomalous message injection or thread changes.

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