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CVE-2026-90843

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.3)

OS Command Injection (CWE-78) in WebMap Nmap Scan Handler

CVE-2026-90843

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77, CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

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Summary

A high-severity OS command injection vulnerability affects WebMap's New Nmap Scan Handler when processing attacker-controlled target or parameter values.

A remote attacker may be able to execute operating-system commands in the application's execution context if those values reach a shell command without safe separation or validation.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the nmap_newscan function within functions_nmap.py, where the New Nmap Scan Handler processes scan targets or related parameters. It becomes risky when remotely supplied values are incorporated into operating-system command execution and the deployment exposes this handler to untrusted users or network clients.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The remotely reachable New Nmap Scan Handler
  • Required access: Access sufficient to submit or influence scan target or parameter values
  • Trigger point: Processing a new scan request by the nmap_newscan function
  • Why exploitation is possible: Attacker-controlled input may be combined with an operating-system command without adequate argument isolation, validation, or shell control

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is command construction from insufficiently trusted input. When application data is passed to a shell or command interpreter as part of a dynamically assembled command, control characters or additional command elements may alter the intended operation.

This maps primarily to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, with CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component describing the broader command-injection class.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute arbitrary operating-system commands
  • The application process and its accessible data could be compromised
  • Credentials, scan results, or configuration data could be exposed
  • The host could be used for persistence, lateral movement, or additional attacks
  • Service availability and integrity could be affected

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on preventing user-controlled data from becoming shell syntax.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Prefer direct process-execution APIs that pass a fixed executable and separate argument values without invoking a shell
  • Apply strict allowlisting and canonical validation to scan targets and supported parameters
  • Reject unexpected delimiters, control characters, option prefixes, and malformed values according to the intended input grammar
  • Avoid dynamically assembled command strings and shell evaluation
  • Run scanning operations with least-privilege accounts, restricted filesystem access, and limited network permissions
  • Enforce authentication, authorization, and rate limits around scan functionality

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for command-injection risks through:

  • Static analysis rules identifying shell execution, command-string concatenation, and interpolation of request data
  • Code review checks for subprocess or process-spawning APIs that invoke a shell
  • Tests using representative invalid and boundary input to confirm strict validation and argument separation
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, unusual command arguments, and anomalous outbound connections
  • Policy enforcement requiring approved process-execution wrappers and denylisting unsafe shell invocation patterns

Automated security review tools may help identify suspicious data flows from request parameters to command execution.

Sources

SourceLink
calledstriker.gitbook.iocalledstriker.gitbook.io/blog/security-research/webmap
github.comgithub.com/SabyasachiRana/WebMap/
github.comgithub.com/SabyasachiRana/WebMap/commit/3d52f65803a2716bff14d938352c6fef45b0cfb6
raw.githubusercontent.comraw.githubusercontent.com/CalledSTRIKER/CalledSTRIKER-gitbook/refs/heads/main/security-research/2026-05-30_12-29.png
vuldb.comvuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-90843
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/925586
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/403395
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/403395/cti

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, the reported attack surface is remote when the New Nmap Scan Handler is network-accessible and accepts attacker-influenced target or parameter values.

The attacker needs whatever access is required to submit a new scan request. Depending on deployment controls, that may be unauthenticated access or an authenticated account with scan permissions.

Use direct, non-shell process execution with fixed executables and separately validated arguments. Strictly constrain accepted scan targets and parameters before execution.

Treat request values as data rather than command fragments, enforce input allowlists, review all process-spawning code, and apply least privilege to the service account and runtime environment.

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