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CVE-2026-90769

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.7)

Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918) in Open Notebook

CVE-2026-90769

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery

CWE:

CWE-918

Impact:

Unauthorized access to internal services and sensitive resources

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.7)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Open Notebook does not sufficiently validate the URL supplied to the sources API, allowing authenticated users to make the application server send HTTP requests to attacker-selected destinations. This may expose cloud metadata, internal services, or localhost-bound endpoints that are not directly reachable from the user's network.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in deployments where the sources API accepts user-provided URLs and the server retrieves those URLs directly without adequate destination validation. Risk is greater when the application can reach cloud metadata services, private network addresses, administrative interfaces, or other services bound only to localhost.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The POST /api/sources endpoint
  • Required access: A valid authenticated account permitted to submit sources
  • Trigger point: Server-side retrieval of a user-supplied URL
  • Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint permits arbitrary destinations without reliably restricting internal, loopback, link-local, or otherwise sensitive network targets

Why this happens

The underlying bug is insufficient validation of externally supplied URLs before the server performs an outbound request. This insecure pattern treats a user-controlled destination as trustworthy, allowing the application to act as a network proxy into environments that may be inaccessible to the attacker directly. The behavior maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may read cloud instance metadata or temporary credentials
  • The application could expose responses from internal network services
  • Localhost-bound administrative endpoints may be reachable
  • Internal service information could be disclosed for reconnaissance
  • Compromised credentials or accessible services could enable further network intrusion

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in user-supplied destinations and restricting outbound connectivity.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Permit only explicitly approved URL schemes, hosts, and destinations
  • Resolve and validate hostnames before connecting, including protection against DNS rebinding
  • Block loopback, link-local, private, reserved, and other sensitive address ranges
  • Apply egress network controls so the application cannot freely reach internal services
  • Avoid returning unrestricted upstream response content to users
  • Run the application with only the network and cloud permissions it requires
  • Use dedicated fetch services with isolated network access for untrusted URLs

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect SSRF risks through:

  • Static analysis for HTTP client calls that consume request parameters without destination validation
  • Code review checks for URL allowlists, redirect handling, DNS resolution, and private-address filtering
  • Dynamic testing with loopback, link-local, private-range, and redirecting destinations in controlled environments
  • Egress monitoring for unusual requests from the application to metadata endpoints or internal address ranges
  • Network policy enforcement that records or blocks unauthorized outbound destinations
  • Automated security review tools that flag user-controlled URLs passed to server-side request functions

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/lfnovo/open-notebook
github.comgithub.com/lfnovo/open-notebook/blob/8889087e317177d7b6e286342ab34e0c9c01d43e/api/routers/sources.py
github.comgithub.com/lfnovo/open-notebook/commit/9045ea50196927eac7de647bb5b7009349236fb4
github.comgithub.com/lfnovo/open-notebook/issues/1284
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/open-notebook-before-1.11.0-server-side-request-forgery-via-link-source

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, an authenticated attacker may be able to trigger server-side requests through the exposed API without having direct network access to the destination.

A valid account with permission to submit or process sources is generally required. The precise scope depends on application authorization and deployment configuration.

Restrict outbound requests to an explicit allowlist, validate resolved addresses and redirects, block sensitive network ranges, and enforce egress network controls.

Treat all user-provided URLs as untrusted, centralize secure URL-fetching logic, apply least-privilege network permissions, and test requests against internal and cloud metadata destinations.

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