Summary
WWBN AVideo contains a missing authorization check in the Scheduler email-job endpoint. An unauthenticated person who possesses a valid site-wide daily token may enumerate scheduler jobs, view private live titles and email addresses, and trigger email delivery.
Affected context
The issue occurs in AVideo's Scheduler plugin, specifically the email-job handling endpoint. Deployments may be at risk when the endpoint accepts a site-wide daily token as sufficient authorization without verifying whether the requester is allowed to view or operate scheduler jobs. The impact depends on token availability, scheduler configuration, and the sensitivity of stored job data.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The Scheduler plugin's email-job endpoint
- Required access: No authenticated account is necessarily required; the requester must possess a valid site-wide daily token
- Trigger point: A request that accesses or operates scheduler email jobs
- Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint uses token validity as a substitute for resource-level authorization and does not adequately restrict access to scheduler data or actions
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authorization design failure mapped to CWE-862: Missing Authorization. The endpoint validates a broadly scoped token but does not consistently enforce permissions for reading scheduler records, accessing associated recipient data, or initiating email operations. This insecure pattern allows an otherwise unauthenticated caller to perform actions that should be limited to authorized users or trusted service roles.
Potential impact
- Attackers may enumerate scheduled email jobs
- Private live titles and recipient email addresses may be disclosed
- Unauthorized email messages may be triggered
- Users may experience spam, phishing, or notification abuse
- Exposed scheduling information may support further targeting
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally centers on enforcing explicit authorization at every scheduler data and action boundary.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Requiring authenticated identities with narrowly scoped permissions for scheduler access
- Treating site-wide tokens as supplemental request validation rather than authorization
- Applying resource-level checks before returning job details or accepting operational requests
- Limiting scheduler actions to dedicated service roles and least-privilege accounts
- Redacting private titles and email addresses unless the caller is authorized to view them
- Binding tokens to intended scopes, audiences, and operations, with controlled expiration and rotation
- Separating read and send permissions so data access does not imply action access
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for:
- Static analysis patterns where sensitive endpoints validate tokens without checking user identity or permissions
- Code review signals involving site-wide tokens used as authorization for user or tenant data
- API tests that exercise scheduler read and send operations with unauthenticated and low-privilege requests
- Audit logs showing repeated token-based access, job enumeration, or unexpected email volume
- Policy enforcement requiring authentication and resource-level authorization for endpoints exposing personal or operational data
- Automated security review tools that flag missing authorization checks on state-changing and sensitive read operations

