Summary
WWBN AVideo contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the user donation-link profile field. An authenticated user may store a crafted value that is later inserted into a donation button's HTML attribute without adequate output encoding, allowing JavaScript to run in the browser of visitors who view affected videos and interact with the button.
Affected context
The issue occurs in AVideo deployments where the CustomizeUser plugin is enabled and the allowDonationLink option causes donation buttons to appear on watch pages. The donation-link value is accepted as a URL, stored in the user profile, retrieved with insufficient encoding, and emitted into an HTML href attribute. The risk depends on an authenticated user being able to update the field and a visitor viewing a page that renders the attacker's donation button.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Authenticated profile-update functionality and watch-page rendering
- Required access: An authenticated account able to update its own donation-link field
- Trigger point: Rendering the user's donation button on an affected video page, followed by the browser processing the resulting link or event interaction
- Required configuration: The CustomizeUser plugin must be enabled with donation links allowed
- Why exploitation is possible: URL validation does not establish safe HTML attribute boundaries, while the later output is not contextually encoded for an
hrefattribute
Why this happens
The vulnerability results from treating validation of a value's apparent URL format as a substitute for context-aware output encoding. The application stores a user-controlled value, applies only tag stripping when retrieving it, and inserts it directly into an HTML attribute. Because attribute-significant characters such as double quotes are not encoded, the stored value may alter the surrounding markup and introduce executable browser behavior. This is a stored cross-site scripting condition mapped to CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation.
Potential impact
- JavaScript execution in the browsers of affected visitors
- Actions performed in the context of a victim's AVideo session
- Exposure of page content or client-side data accessible to the victim
- Account or administrative actions performed through the victim's browser
- Reputation damage or broader compromise of users who view affected content
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on treating profile fields as untrusted data throughout their lifecycle and applying context-appropriate output encoding.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Encode values specifically for HTML attribute contexts at the final output point
- Prefer safe URL construction and allowlisted schemes and hosts where appropriate
- Use framework templating APIs that escape attribute values by default
- Avoid relying on URL validation, tag stripping, or canonicalization as substitutes for output encoding
- Restrict who may configure or display donation links when the feature is not required
- Apply a restrictive Content Security Policy as defense in depth
- Limit account and administrative privileges to reduce the effect of browser-based abuse
How teams detect issues like this
Detection may include:
- Static analysis rules identifying unescaped user-controlled data in HTML attributes
- Code review checks for direct interpolation into
href,src, event-handler, and other browser-interpreted contexts - Tests that verify quote characters and other attribute delimiters are encoded at render time
- Review of profile-update endpoints, serializer methods, and template helpers for inconsistent validation and output handling
- Policy enforcement requiring contextual auto-escaping or approved templating APIs
- Automated application security testing that exercises stored input across profile pages and watch-page rendering paths

