Summary
Apache Camel's Camel-Jgroups component can deserialize untrusted Java objects received through JGroups before Camel processes the message. If an attacker can reach the JGroups communication endpoint and a suitable gadget chain exists on the application classpath, the issue may enable remote code execution in the Camel process.
Apache Camel's Camel-Jgroups component can deserialize untrusted Java objects received through JGroups before Camel processes the message. If an attacker can reach the JGroups communication endpoint and a suitable gadget chain exists on the application classpath, the issue may enable remote code execution in the Camel process.
Affected context
The vulnerability affects Camel-Jgroups consumers that receive JGroups ObjectMessage payloads through the component's default or similarly configured channel. JGroups deserializes the payload on its receive thread before Camel's exchange creation and routing logic can inspect it. Risk is increased when the channel lacks authentication or encryption and is reachable by an adjacent host.
The vulnerability affects Camel-Jgroups consumers that receive JGroups ObjectMessage payloads through the component's default or similarly configured channel. JGroups deserializes the payload on its receive thread before Camel's exchange creation and routing logic can inspect it. Risk is increased when the channel lacks authentication or encryption and is reachable by an adjacent host.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: JGroups network communication through the configured multicast group or bind port
- Required access: Network reachability to the JGroups cluster; application authentication is not necessarily required when the channel lacks suitable access controls
- Trigger point: Receipt of an ObjectMessage by the JGroups consumer
- Additional condition: A usable deserialization gadget chain must be available through classes on the Camel application's classpath
- Why exploitation is possible: JGroups materializes the serialized object before Camel receives the resulting message, and no object serialization filter is applied on the affected path by default
- Attack surface: JGroups network communication through the configured multicast group or bind port
- Required access: Network reachability to the JGroups cluster; application authentication is not necessarily required when the channel lacks suitable access controls
- Trigger point: Receipt of an ObjectMessage by the JGroups consumer
- Additional condition: A usable deserialization gadget chain must be available through classes on the Camel application's classpath
- Why exploitation is possible: JGroups materializes the serialized object before Camel receives the resulting message, and no object serialization filter is applied on the affected path by default
Why this happens
The component accepts serialized Java objects from a network-facing JGroups channel without applying an ObjectInputFilter or an equivalent pre-deserialization allowlist. JGroups invokes Java object deserialization before Camel's receiver can validate the message, allowing deserialization callbacks associated with classes on the application classpath to execute. This behavior maps to CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data, where attacker-controlled serialized data is converted into objects without sufficient trust-boundary enforcement.
The component accepts serialized Java objects from a network-facing JGroups channel without applying an ObjectInputFilter or an equivalent pre-deserialization allowlist. JGroups invokes Java object deserialization before Camel's receiver can validate the message, allowing deserialization callbacks associated with classes on the application classpath to execute. This behavior maps to CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data, where attacker-controlled serialized data is converted into objects without sufficient trust-boundary enforcement.
Potential impact
- An attacker could execute arbitrary code in the Camel process
- The application process or its host could be compromised
- Application data could be read, modified, or destroyed
- Credentials and other runtime secrets could be exposed
- The vulnerable service could be used for lateral movement within reachable networks
- An attacker could execute arbitrary code in the Camel process
- The application process or its host could be compromised
- Application data could be read, modified, or destroyed
- Credentials and other runtime secrets could be exposed
- The vulnerable service could be used for lateral movement within reachable networks
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation focuses on preventing untrusted serialized objects from reaching unrestricted Java deserialization.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Apply an
ObjectInputFilteror equivalent allowlist before any serialized object is read - Prefer non-Java-serialization message formats with explicit schemas and safe parsers
- Configure JGroups channels with authentication and encryption rather than relying on open transport defaults
- Restrict multicast and bind-port exposure through network segmentation and firewall policy
- Limit application classpaths and remove unnecessary gadget-producing dependencies
- Run Camel with least privilege and isolate the process from sensitive host and network resources
- Treat Camel-side validation as supplemental, since it cannot prevent code execution during earlier deserialization
Mitigation focuses on preventing untrusted serialized objects from reaching unrestricted Java deserialization.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Apply an
ObjectInputFilteror equivalent allowlist before any serialized object is read - Prefer non-Java-serialization message formats with explicit schemas and safe parsers
- Configure JGroups channels with authentication and encryption rather than relying on open transport defaults
- Restrict multicast and bind-port exposure through network segmentation and firewall policy
- Limit application classpaths and remove unnecessary gadget-producing dependencies
- Run Camel with least privilege and isolate the process from sensitive host and network resources
- Treat Camel-side validation as supplemental, since it cannot prevent code execution during earlier deserialization
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can combine code, configuration, and network review:
- Use static analysis to identify
ObjectInputStream, unrestricted Java serialization, and deserialization paths that lack filters - Review Camel-Jgroups and JGroups configuration for ObjectMessage usage, unauthenticated channels, unencrypted transport, and exposed multicast or bind ports
- Check dependency inventories for libraries commonly associated with deserialization gadget chains
- Add policy checks that require serialization filters or approved message formats for network-originated data
- Monitor JGroups membership changes, unexpected senders, anomalous serialized message traffic, and suspicious child-process activity from Camel services
- Automated code and configuration review tools may help identify unsafe deserialization patterns during development
Detection can combine code, configuration, and network review:
- Use static analysis to identify
ObjectInputStream, unrestricted Java serialization, and deserialization paths that lack filters - Review Camel-Jgroups and JGroups configuration for ObjectMessage usage, unauthenticated channels, unencrypted transport, and exposed multicast or bind ports
- Check dependency inventories for libraries commonly associated with deserialization gadget chains
- Add policy checks that require serialization filters or approved message formats for network-originated data
- Monitor JGroups membership changes, unexpected senders, anomalous serialized message traffic, and suspicious child-process activity from Camel services
- Automated code and configuration review tools may help identify unsafe deserialization patterns during development
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| camel. | camel.apache.org/ |
| camel. | camel.apache.org/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
| issues. | issues.apache.org/ |
| issues. | issues.apache.org/ |
