/

CVE-2026-88888

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.0)

Command Injection (CWE-78) in Renovate Mix Manager

CVE-2026-88888

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Arbitrary command execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.0)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A command injection vulnerability in Renovate's Mix manager allows malicious package names to introduce shell metacharacters when private dependencies are processed. Under the affected Docker binary-source mode, an attacker who can influence dependency data may execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the Renovate user.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Renovate's Mix manager when it processes private dependencies and incorporates organization or package-name values into shell commands without sufficient escaping. Risk is present when dependency metadata can be influenced by an untrusted or compromised package source and the deployment uses binarySource=docker mode.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Renovate's Mix manager dependency-processing workflow - Required access: Ability to influence a private dependency or its package

name, typically through a package source or dependency metadata

  • Trigger point: Processing the dependency while Docker is selected as the

binary source

  • Why exploitation is possible: Unescaped attacker-controlled values may be

interpreted by a shell as command syntax

Why this happens

The underlying bug is failure to treat dependency metadata as untrusted data before embedding it in a shell command. When organization or package-name parameters are concatenated or passed through an insufficiently controlled shell invocation, shell metacharacters can change the intended command structure. This behavior maps to CWE-78, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute arbitrary commands as the Renovate user.
  • The Renovate runtime could be compromised.
  • Repository credentials, tokens, or other accessible secrets could be exposed.
  • Malicious commands could alter generated changes, dependency data, or build artifacts.
  • The affected host or container could be used for further unauthorized activity.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on removing shell interpretation from dependency handling and reducing trust in package metadata. Secure-by-default patterns include invoking programs directly with structured argument arrays, applying strict validation and allowlists to organization and package identifiers, and avoiding command construction through string concatenation. Where shell use cannot be avoided, command arguments should be isolated from interpreted syntax using platform-appropriate safe APIs. Renovate should run with least privilege, minimal filesystem access, restricted network permissions, and narrowly scoped credentials.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can include static analysis for shell execution APIs, string concatenation involving package names or organization parameters, and insufficiently validated values passed to subprocess or command runners. Code review should examine every path from dependency metadata to process invocation, especially Docker-related manager logic. Policy enforcement can require structured process APIs, argument allowlists, and security-focused tests for metacharacter handling. Automated code review and SAST tools may help identify these patterns.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/renovatebot/renovate/security/advisories/GHSA-v85g-rq5w-c46q
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/renovate-before-44.14.7-command-injection-via-mix-organization

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on whether an attacker can influence private dependency metadata or package names processed by Renovate. It is not necessarily exposed as a standalone network service.

The attacker generally needs a way to introduce or control relevant dependency information that reaches the Mix manager while Docker binary-source mode is active.

Avoid shell interpretation by using direct process execution with structured arguments, and validate package and organization identifiers against strict expected formats.

Treat all dependency metadata as untrusted, apply least privilege to automation accounts, and use code review, static analysis, and regression tests for command-construction paths.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.