Summary
A high-severity command injection vulnerability in Renovate's gomod manager can allow shell metacharacters in dependency names to reach import-path update commands without adequate escaping.
When Docker binary mode and import-path update processing are enabled, a malicious dependency name may cause arbitrary commands to run with the privileges of the Renovate process.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in Renovate deployments that use the gomod manager for Go module major version updates while both Docker-based binary execution and gomodUpdateImportPaths post-update processing are enabled. Risk depends on whether dependency metadata can be influenced by an attacker and whether Renovate processes that metadata in an environment where command execution is available.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Renovate's gomod manager and its import-path update command handling
- Required access: Ability to introduce or control a dependency name or related module metadata that Renovate processes
- Trigger point: Go module major version update processing with
gomodUpdateImportPathsenabled - Execution context: Renovate must run with Docker binary mode enabled and have permission to execute the affected command path
- Why exploitation is possible: Dependency-name data is incorporated into a shell-invoked command without sufficient escaping or neutralization of shell metacharacters
Why this happens
The underlying bug is improper neutralization of special elements used in an operating-system command. The gomod manager treats a dependency name as ordinary command data, but fails to maintain a strict separation between data and shell syntax before constructing the import-path update command.
This maps to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'). The insecure pattern is assembling shell commands from externally influenced values instead of using safe argument boundaries and non-shell execution interfaces.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary commands as the Renovate user.
- The Renovate runtime could be modified or used to access available credentials.
- Source repositories, build systems, or package metadata may be tampered with.
- The vulnerability could enable further compromise of systems reachable from the Renovate environment.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating shell interpretation of dependency-derived values and reducing the trust placed in package metadata.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Using direct process-execution APIs with structured argument arrays rather than shell command construction
- Applying strict validation and canonicalization to dependency names before they reach command handlers
- Disabling import-path update automation when it is not required
- Restricting Docker and Renovate runtime privileges, credentials, network access, and filesystem visibility
- Running automation in isolated, short-lived environments with read-only or minimally writable workspaces
- Treating dependency metadata as untrusted input throughout update workflows
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this issue through:
- Static analysis rules that identify shell execution with concatenated or interpolated dependency values
- Code review checks for command construction involving module names, repository metadata, or package manifests
- Tests using benign metacharacter-bearing input to verify that values remain single arguments and are never interpreted by a shell
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, command interpreters, network connections, or file changes from Renovate workers
- Policy enforcement requiring non-shell process APIs and approved input-validation wrappers
Automated code review and software composition analysis tools may help identify unsafe command execution patterns, but should be supplemented with targeted security testing.

